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Increasingly, law, ethics, and policy recognize the right of individuals with 
impaired decisional abilities, including older adults with dementia, to be involved 
in medical treatment decisions.  These shifts are in tension with current practice 
addressing the decision-making needs of individuals with impaired decisional 
abilities.  In accordance with current practice, surrogates replace individuals as 
medical decision-makers once a health care provider or court determines that the 
individual lacks decision-making capacity.   
The first part of this dissertation examined the history and theory of 
capacity determination as a component of the doctrine of informed consent to 
consider whether the current approach to decisional capacity is consistent with 
the ethical principles of autonomy and beneficence, concluding that the 
dichotomous structure of the current approach is inconsistent with the ethical 
principles because it neither offers decision-making support to individuals who 
may need it, nor includes individuals who remain able to meaningfully 
participate in their treatment decisions.    
Next, using Degner’s Control Preference Scale as modified by Nolan and 
colleagues (MCPS), a group of facility-dwelling older adults representing a range 
of cognitive function were asked to use the MCPS and responses to
 iv 
semistructured interviews to describe their role in a past, and preferred role in a 
future decision-making encounter.  
Evidence of validity and reliability was generated by comparing MCPS 
responses to the responses in a study that excluded individuals with cognitive 
impairment, by assessing logical and internal consistency within participants’ 
responses, and by using triangulation to evaluate whether narrative responses 
and MCPS responses were aligned.  All three approaches supported the validity 
and reliability of using the MCPS in the study population. 
Overwhelmingly, participants expressed a desire to be involved in their 
own care, with half expressing the desire for shared decision-making with their 
physicians.  The level of involvement desired from the family was less, with one-
fourth of the participants selecting a shared role and two-thirds selecting a 
passive role for the family.  There was a shift toward the family when participants 
were asked how decisions should be made if they were fully unable to participate 
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Statement of the Problem 
A patient’s right to accept or reject medical care is a fundamental 
component of contemporary healthcare, but it is widely agreed that this right is 
limited when a patient lacks decision-making capacity.  In recent decades, 
however, shifts in ethics, law, and policy increasingly recognize the rights of 
patients with impaired cognitive capacity to participate in decisions about their 
treatment.  These shifts are supported by evidence suggesting that older adults 
with impaired cognitive function who are encouraged to make choices about their 
lives have better outcomes across a range of measures than those who are 
prevented from making routine choices.  The shifts are also supported by 
evidence suggesting that older adults with impaired cognitive function are able to 
state consistent preferences, goals, and values over time.  The shifts are also 
aligned with related healthcare policy that increasingly emphasizes the need to 
deliver patient-centered care. 
Research on decision-making capacity has been narrowly focused on how 
to divide adults with impaired decisional abilities into two categories:  those who 
have and those who lack decision-making capacity as measured by criteria found 
   2 
 
in case and statutory law (Berg, Appelbaum, & Grisso, 1996).  This system of 
capacity assessment is emphatically dichotomous:  According to practice 
guidelines and medical journals, a provider who concludes that a patient lacks 
capacity should seek informed consent from a surrogate decision-maker 
(Appelbaum, 2007; Reuben et al., 2014).  This dichotomous view of capacity 
results in the exclusion of individuals from the decision-making process, even 
when many, perhaps even a majority, of individuals with cognitive impairment 
retain the ability to participate in decision-making.  As a recent article declared, 
“The current legal-medical model for competency determinations fails to 
accurately reflect the complexities of declining capacity in an aging population” 
(Arias, 2013, pp. 134-135). 
A new legal, medical, and ethical framework is needed to address the 
decision-making needs of older adults with impaired decisional abilities.  
Effective strategies are needed for eliciting decision involvement preferences 
from individuals with impaired decisional abilities and for meaningfully involving 
these individuals in decisions about medical treatment, as well as other decisions 
such as choice of residence.   A program of research could provide direction to 
policy-makers, as well as patients, caregivers, providers, attorneys, and judges 
who need guidance to address the challenge. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to review the ethics, policy, and law governing 
medical decision-making for patients with impaired cognitive function, and to 
describe the treatment decision-making practices and preferences of older adults 
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across a range of cognitive function.  The data will be used to guide further 
research on decision-making for older adults with impaired decisional abilities. 
 
Significance of the Study 
Demographic Trends 
The importance of a new decision-making approach will grow in 
proportion to number of older adults with cognitive impairment, which in turn 
will grow in proportion to the number of older adults in the population.  The U.S. 
Census Bureau (2012) projected that the number of individuals aged 65 and older 
will nearly double between 2015 (47.7 million) and 2050 (92 million), while the 
population of individuals aged 85 and older is projected to more than triple.  
Often, with advancing age comes cognitive impairment.  Plassman and colleagues 
(2007) estimated the national prevalence of dementia to be 13.93% (CI 11.42-
16.44) for adults aged 71 and older.  Prevalence rates increase with each decade of 
life, from 4.97% (CI 2.61-7.32) for age 71 to 79 years, 24.19% (CI 19.28-29.11) for 
age 80 to 89 years, and 37.36% (CI 25.45-49.27) for age 90 and older.  Without 
an unforeseen breakthrough in the treatment of illness that causes impaired 
decisional abilities occurs, the number of older adults facing impairment in 
decisional abilities is likely to rise dramatically in the coming decades.   
 
Specific Aims 
Specific Aim 1 (Chapter 4) 
Describe the history and theory of capacity assessment, and explore 
whether the current approach to capacity assessment achieves the ethical 
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objectives of informed consent doctrine.    
 
Specific Aim 2 (Chapter 5) 
Evaluate the validity and reliability of a modified Control Preference Scale 
(MCPS) (Degner, Sloan, & Venkatesh, 1997; Nolan et al., 2005) as a measure of 
decision-making preferences for older adults representing a range of cognitive 
function. 
 
Research Question 2.1: Convergent Validity  
Are participants’ responses the same as or different from the responses of 
individuals in the study by Nolan et al. (2005), in which participants responded 
to a series of overlapping questions, but from which participants with moderate 
to severe cognitive impairment or delirium were excluded?  
 
Research Question 2.2: Convergent Validity  
Were within subject responses to related questions correlated? 
 
Research Question 2.3: Reliability 
Were participants’ responses to related MCPS questions internally 
consistent?  
 
Research Question 2.4: Content Validity  
Did participants’ responses to cognitive interviewing questions designed to 
elicit their understanding of interview items or spontaneous explanations of their 
   5 
 
responses support the content validity of participants’ MCPS responses?  
 
Specific Aim 3 (Chapter 6) 
Describe the decision control patterns and preferences of older adults 
representing a range of cognitive function.  
 
Research Question 3.1 
What level of control do older adults representing a range of cognitive 
function prefer in treatment decisions as weighed against the physician? 
 
Research Question 3.2 
What level of control do older adults representing a range of cognitive 
function prefer in treatment decisions as weighed against a companion? 
 
Research Question 3.3 
How do older adults weigh input from a physician compared to a 
companion during decision-making encounters:  in the present with the 
individual’s involvement, and during a hypothetical future encounter the 
individual unconscious and fully unable to participate in the decision-making 
process? 
 
Research Question 3.4 
Were there relationships between: participants’ level of control (past and 
future preferred) weighed against the physician’s level of control; participants’ 
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level of control (past and future preferred) weighed against the decision 
companion’s level of control; and between the relative weight given to input from 
the physician and companion in a future decision when the participant is 
involved compared to when the participant is seriously ill and unable to be 
involved? 
 
Research Question 3.5  
Were there relationships between level of cognitive impairment and 
preferred level of control? 
 
Research Question 3.6  
What characteristics of the decision-making process are important to older 
adults across a range of cognitive function that are not captured in the CPS? 
 
Organization of Manuscript  
This seven-chapter manuscript contains the following chapters: 
Chapter 1, Introduction 
Chapter 2, Background and History 
Chapter 3, Methods 
Chapter 4, Article:  History and Theory of Capacity Assessment in a 
Changing Ethical, Legal, and Policy Landscape  (reports the results of Specific 
Aim 1) 
Chapter 5, Article:  Validity and Reliability of Using the Control Preference 
Scale and Related Questions to Elicit Decision-Making Preferences of Older 
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Adults Across a Range of Cognitive Function (reports the results of Specific Aim 
2) 
Chapter 6, Listen to Me: Decision Involvement Preferences of Older Adults 
Across a Range of Cognitive Function (reports the results of Specific Aim 3) 
Chapter 7, Discussion and Conclusions 
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BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND THEORY 
 
It is perplexing that a healthcare system that emphasizes the patient’s 
right to make treatment decisions also embraces a system component that, with 
little to no oversight, categorically excludes a substantial proportion of older 
adults (as well as younger adults with mental health challenges and intellectual 
disabilities) from decisions about their care.  The purpose of this chapter is to 
consider how the system for addressing the needs of adults with impaired 
decisional abilities came to be and to introduce Self-Determination Theory and 
the Stress Process Model, which can serve as a theoretical basis for the 
development of an alternative to the current approach.   
 
Informed Consent 
It is impossible to address the question of medical decision-making 
involvement without first addressing providers’ ethical and legal obligations to 
obtain informed consent for treatment from a patient or a surrogate prior to 
providing medical treatment.  The intertwining law and ethics of informed 
consent saw dramatic changes in the latter half of the 20th century.  In the early 
20th century, the law required simple consent, not informed consent to treatment.  
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It was articulated in the phrase, “every human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what should be done with his own body” 
(Schloendorff v . Society  of New  York Hospital, 105 NE 92 (NY, 1914)).  If a 
physician operated on a patient without the patient’s consent, the patient could 
sue the physician for battery.  The nature of the information disclosed by the 
physician was not discussed in these cases, and the cases were uncommon 
(Meisel, Roth, & Lidz, 1977). 
Beginning in the mid-20th century, however, judges increasingly ruled 
that consent was meaningless if the patient lacked necessary information about 
the proposed treatment (Canterbury  v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 
Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960)).   No longer was a patient’s 
permission alone adequate to protect the physician from a claim of providing 
treatment without consent.  After Natanson  and Mitchell v . Robinson , 334 
S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960), health care providers were required to disclose significant 
facts that would be necessary for the patient to intelligently consent to the 
proposed treatment.  
Moving in parallel with the courts, ethicists in the emerging discipline of 
bioethics articulated and defined a patient’s right to autonomy. Drought and 
Koenig (2002) suggested that, because bioethics emerged in 1960s and 1970s 
when civil libertarians were fighting for the rights of oppressed groups of 
individuals, informed consent for medical treatment followed the fiercely 
individualistic tone of the other movements that were rooted in the right to 
autonomy. Whether or not it was due to the larger social and political context, the 
legal and ethical concept of meaningful informed consent was then, and remains 
11 
 
now, heavily influenced by the individualistic philosophical principal of 
autonomy (Faden, Beauchamp, & King, 1986).  Informed consent is the primary 
mechanism for exercising patient autonomy in contemporary bioethics (Moreno, 
1994), even when autonomy may be at odds with the practicalities of decision-
making (Kapp, 1991). 
Informed consent requires that the health care provider disclose to the 
patient sufficient information to enable the patient to understand and evaluate 
the need for treatment, the risks and benefits of proposed treatment, and 
alternatives to the proposed treatment (Berg & Appelbaum, 2001).  There is 
much discussion about what information is sufficient, what risks and benefits 
should be disclosed, and the scope of alternatives that should be discussed; those 
discussions are outside the scope of this review.  Informed consent must be 
voluntary, but voluntariness, like the meaning of sufficient information, is a 
necessary, but difficult-to-define element of informed consent that is the subject 
of much debate (Roberts, 2002); it will not be addressed in this manuscript.  
Finally, consent must be provided by a patient who has the capacity to make a 
health care decision (Berg & Appelbaum, 2001).  Decision-making capacity holds 
a dominant position in the literature on autonomy’s role in informed consent 
(Naik, Dyer, Kunik, & McCullough, 2009).   
 
The Ethical Underpinnings of Capacity to Consent 
Autonomy 
The requirement that a patient have capacity to consent is framed in 
ethical, legal, and practical terms. Autonomy is at the heart of the informed 
12 
 
consent doctrine.  Autonomy has been described as “nearly synonymous with 
human dignity” even though it is “vague at best” (May, 1994, p. 133), and its use 
in medical ethics is “far from clear” (Lidz & Arnold, 1992, p. 606).  In the capacity 
assessment literature, the relationship between autonomy and capacity to 
consent to treatment is presented as fact, or it is used in a loose and poorly 
defined manner (Secker, 1999a, 1999b).  What is meant by autonomy is rarely 
explicated or examined in the capacity assessment literature. 
Kantian bioethicists promote autonomous decision-making by patients, 
focusing on patients’ ultimate decisional authority (Secker, 1999a). Kapp (1991) 
describes this view of autonomy as a “pure autonomy model” (p. 620).  Some 
scholars have been critical of the unexamined use of and references to autonomy 
in contemporary bioethics because the fuzziness of the concept has concrete 
implications for patients and providers (Beauchamp, 2004; Secker, 1999b).  The 
dichotomous view of individuals who “lack capacity” as “nonautonomous” 
dominates the capacity assessment literature.  If a person who lacks capacity is 
“nonautonomous” (Berg, Appelbaum, & Grisso, 1996, p. 380), then the person’s 
right to have decisions made based on his or her current stated values, 
preferences, goals, or even moral beliefs is rendered meaningless.  Alternatively, 
capacity can be framed as either the amount of autonomy an individual possesses 
or as the weight that should be given to respect for autonomy (Beauchamp, 
2004).  Framed in this manner, capacity is characteristic that can be measured 
incrementally, leaving room for respect for the autonomy of an individual with 
impaired decisional abilities.   
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The following sections from a seminal law review article by Berg, 
Appelbaum, and Grisso (1996), which explains the ethical and legal basis for the 
dichotomous view of capacity, illustrates the fuzziness of the conceptualization of 
autonomy the capacity framework depends on.  The article remains the most 
thorough explication of the legal and ethical support for the current capacity 
assessment regime, but autonomy and its relationship to legal implications is 
never clearly defined.  In explaining the need for capacity assessment, the authors 
wrote:  
Autonomy requires that the patient be offered an active role in the 
decision-making [sic] process.  This principle recognizes that although 
physicians have technical expertise, patients have an essential knowledge 
of their own subjective values and are the best judges of their own 
interests. There is also an intrinsic value in autonomy; even if an outside 
expert is better able to make a decision, it is preferable to allow a 
competent individual to make his or her own choices. Embedded in the 
philosophical notion of autonomy are concrete requirements of capacity.  
To the extent that a patient's capacity is impaired with respect to abilities 
necessary to exercise autonomy, that person is less able to participate 
competently in the decision-making [sic] process.  (Berg et al., 1996, pp. 
346-347) 
In a footnote, the authors, quoting Cutter and Shelp (1991, p. 102) explained: 
Autonomy enables a person to "examine even his naturally given needs 
and desires and choose whether to identify with them, shun them, or 
pursue them."   This requires the person to form a "coherent picture of the 
world and of his place in it."  In addition, it is "essential that the 
autonomous person be generally rational in his thinking and judging 
processes." (Berg et al., 1996, pp. 346-347) 
In these two passages, the authors describe what autonomy does, why it’s 
valuable, and what it requires, but they do not describe what it is.  In another 
footnote, citing Cutter and Shelp (1991), the authors characterize autonomy as 
“refer[ring] to the capacity to make independent decisions in general” (p. 347).  
While they also reference “three academic models of autonomy, including total 
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independence, free action, and effective deliberation, and proposing a fourth 
model: consistency with one's values and life goals,” referring to Lidz and Arnold 
(1992), they do not explain which of the models supports the dichotomous 
approach to capacity (Berg et al., 1996, p. 347).   
The theory of autonomy embraced, if not clearly stated, by Berg, 
Appelbaum, and Grisso appears to be a formal theory, which would likely align 
with the effective deliberation model.  A formal theory of autonomy is 
characterized by “formal requirements that describe the necessary characteristics 
or capacities of particular people or particular decision-making processes” 
(Schwab, 2006, p. 576). Berg and colleagues assert that “autonomy focuses on the 
process of decision-making [sic], not the outcome,” because “an autonomous 
choice is one that is the product of autonomous action, regardless of whether its 
result is ‘good’ or ‘bad,’" consequently, “[s]tandards should focus on the decision-
making [sic] process rather than the final decision”  (Berg et al., 1996, p. 352).   
Schwab criticized the use of a formal view of capacity in the healthcare 
setting.  While acknowledging the value of defining formal autonomy, “this view 
fall[s] short of appropriate goals of responsible healthcare” (Schwab, 2006), 
because the focus is on process not outcome.  Schwab offered an illustration:  
“Autonomously desiring to have a long life would be important, and actually 
having a long life would not (or would be less so)” (2006, p. 577).  The Berg, 
Appelbaum, and Grisso framework is vulnerable to this problem, because it 
asserts that the ability to engage in the decision-making process should be the 
focus of the inquiry, not whether the treatment delivered aligns with the 
individual’s goals, values, or preferences. 
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Kapp (1991) offered yet another conceptualization of the relationship 
between autonomy and medical decision-making in the long-term care setting.  
Kapp’s approach differs from the formal approach because it reflects the practical 
reality that older adults, even those viewed as having decision-making capacity, 
often choose to share decision-making.  This practical, shared decision approach 
to autonomy and decision-making offers an alternative to the pure or formal 
conceptualizations of autonomy, and is reflected in the emerging field of 
supported decision-making, described below.   
Gordon (2000), described the view that “independent decision-making is a 
myth … every adult uses interdependent decision-making in the course of getting 
through the day” (p. 65).  Similarly, Lidz and Arnold (1992) described “a 
[decision-making] model that looked at the relationship between patients' lives 
and their goals and commitments” (p. 607) for residents of nursing homes. 
Although these characterizations of the role of autonomy in decision-making may 
more accurately reflect the reality of decision-making, the pure autonomy/formal 
model described by Berg, Grisso, Appelbaum dominates the capacity-assessment 
literature.   
 
Beneficence 
Beneficence is “a family of overlapping virtues” including “kindness, 
generosity, compassion, sympathy, considerateness, sensitivity, loyalty, 
friendliness and affectionateness” and decency, defined as “readiness to render 
effective help to others in an emergency” (Ashcroft, 2007, p. 22).  Beneficence 
and autonomy appear to be at odds in the health care setting, because 
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beneficence is the ethical principle that is used to justify the provision of care 
against the patient’s will for the purpose of preserving the patient’s wellbeing. For 
example, self-extubation is a recognized problem with mechanical ventilation, 
which is treated or prevented with sedation (Vassal et al., 1993).  Intubation and 
sedation may be provided without the consent of the patient or a surrogate (Code 
of Ethics for Emergency Physicians, 2011) because immediate treatment is 
necessary to prevent death or serious harm to the patient and we presume that 
most patients would want these interventions.   
 
Balancing Autonomy and Beneficence 
The capacity assessment literature contains many references to the need to 
strike a balance between autonomy and beneficence. Appelbaum and Grisso 
(1988) described the process of line-drawing between those with the capacity to 
make decisions and those who lack that capacity as the balance between 
protection against bad decisions and autonomy-protection.  Nearly 20 years later, 
Appelbaum (2007) continued to describe the process of capacity assessment as 
balancing autonomy against the need for protection.  The emphasis on balancing 
between the two ethical principles suggests a need to consider autonomy only 
when the patient is capable of making informed decisions, with beneficence being 
the sole consideration when a patient has impaired decisional abilities; this 
balancing approach places no consideration on the goodness or badness of the 
decision that the patient would have made, if permitted.  Rather, a balancing 
process that concludes that beneficence outweighs autonomy triggers the need 
for a substitute decision-maker:  “When patients lack the competence to make a 
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decision about treatment, substitute decision makers must be sought” 
(Appelbaum, 2007, p. 1834).   
Buchanan (2004), in contrast, suggests that the determination of whether 
autonomy should be outweighed by beneficence should be based on severity of 
the harm that might result from a potentially harmful decision.  Decisions with 
little potential for harm, such as whether to consent to a blood test, would require 
a low level of capacity, while decisions that could result in death or serious injury 
would require a high level of capacity.  Research suggests that this sliding scale 
approach is used in practice (Kim, Caine, Swan, & Appelbaum, 2006).  Berg and 
colleagues acknowledged Buchanan’s approach, but did not operationalize it in 
their capacity assessment approach.  As dichotomous approaches to capacity, 
both assume that, at every point in time, for every patient, and for every decision, 
there is a point on a capacity spectrum at which the level of impairment renders 
the patient incapable of making an autonomous decision, and therefore lacking 
capacity.  Patients’ choices deserve no respect or deference and a surrogate 
replaces the patient as a decision maker (Appelbaum, 2007) once that point is 
crossed.   
Cullity (2007) described an approach to balancing autonomy and 
beneficence that is not dichotomous.  Cullity suggested that the promotion and 
protection of autonomy is a component of beneficence.  In his view, it is wrong to 
view autonomy as a constraint on beneficence; rather respect for autonomy is a 
component of beneficence that is necessary for good medical practice.  He 
asserted that failure to promote autonomy is often at odds with beneficence.  
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These conflicting accounts of how to balance autonomy and beneficence 
illustrate a challenge to philosophers who suggest that ethical judgments can be 
made by first identifying the midlevel theory, such as autonomy or beneficence, 
then applying the theory to specific cases to determine the ethical result (Capron 
& Michel, 1993). The capacity assessment literature contains a number of 
illustrations of this approach (Appelbaum, 2007; Moye, 2000).  The midlevel 
approach, which is put forth as an alternative to deducing ethical rules from 
fundamental moral theories, such as Kantian deontology or Utilitarianism, was 
appealing in bioethics because the use of fundamental moral theory to resolve the 
types of ethical dilemmas that arise in bioethics had not been effective.  
Unfortunately, midlevel theories were no more successful at resolving ethical 
dilemmas than fundamental theories because they lack the ability to prioritize 
one theory over another (Capron & Michel, 1993).  
 
The Elements of Decision-Making Capacity 
As the doctrine of informed consent was developing, there was a very little 
agreement on how to define the capacity to consent to treatment in law or 
medicine (Roth, Meisel, & Lidz, 1977).  In a series of articles that attempted to 
bring structure to the field, Roth and his colleagues identified five possible 
elements of capacity:  evidencing a choice,  ‘reasonable’ outcome of choice, choice 
based on ‘rational’ reasons, ability to understand, and actual understanding 
(Roth, Meisel, & Lidz, 1977).     
The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study, the single most influential 
research effort on capacity assessment to date, began in 1988 and was led by 
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Appelbaum and Grisso.  The effort developed and expanded on the concepts first 
introduced by Roth, Meisel, and Lidz.  The study was designed to generate 
empirical data that could inform policy makers and clinicians about capacity 
among people hospitalized with mental illness (Appelbaum, 2004; Appelbaum & 
Grisso, 2004).  As Appelbaum wrote, “a compound standard of competence, 
drawn from the case law and often reflected in statutes and commentary, formed 
the basis for the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study” (1998, p. 379).  
Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso articulated a “legal standards” approach to 
capacity with four elements (Berg et al., 1996).  Co m m u n ica t in g  a choice is 
largely self-explanatory, but, in addition to either expressing or failing to express 
a choice, it includes the ability to communicate a consistent choice over time.  A 
patient must be able to u n d er s t a n d  information about the benefits and burdens 
of the proposed treatment, as well as alternative treatments.  Grisso and 
Appelbaum (1998) emphasized the need for a provider to assure that adequate 
information is given to the patient to support understanding, so that a patient’s 
capacity is not called into question because the provider has failed to disclose 
sufficient information to the patient.  Ap p r ecia t io n  is the ability to assess the 
proposed treatment as it relates to the person making the decision, not just as an 
abstract concept.  Finally, r ea s o n in g  involves the ability to evaluate, weigh, and 
manipulate the information received.  The assessment of reasoning does not 
consider the reasonableness of the outcome, but focuses instead on the 
consistency of the reasoning (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988, p. 1636).  Berg, 
Appelbaum, and Grisso (1996) asserted that a patient whose capacity is in 
question should be required to demonstrate the ability to meet all four of the 
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legal standards, although they acknowledged that statutory and case law often 
required only a subset of the four. 
In addition to establishing the legal standards capacity construct, the 
effort developed and tested a number of preliminary instruments for measuring 
decision-making capacity, such as the Thinking Rationally  About Treatm ent 
measure, which evaluated the patient’s reasoning about information when 
making a treatment decision (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1993).  Preliminary 
instruments were combined into the MacArthur Capacity Assessment Tool – 
Treatment (MacCAT-T) (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995) and the MacArthur Capacity 
Assessment Tool – Research (MacCAT-R) (Grisso, Appelbaum, Mulvey, & 
Fletcher, 1995).   If these or similar instruments designed to assess decision-
making capacity suggest that a patient’s capacity may be impaired, measures 
should be taken to assure that the impairment is not treatable or reversible 
(Appelbaum, 2007), and to assure that sensory disabilities are addressed 
(Sugarman, McCrory, & Hubal, 1998).  If, however, additional measures fail to 
improve the patient’s abilities, Appelbaum and others recommended that 
providers identify a surrogate decision maker who will make decisions on behalf 
of the impaired patient (Appelbaum, 2007).  No mention is made about the role 
of the individual from this point forward. 
A number of concerns about the legal standards approach for defining 
capacity were expressed in 1996, shortly after the publication of the MacCAT-R.  
While authors published in a 1996 special issue of Psychology , Public Policy , and 
Law  broadly agreed that the MacArthur Treatment Capacity Study had made 
significant contributions to the field of capacity assessment, they expressed a 
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range of concerns about the instruments and constructs.  Kapp and Mossman 
(1996), for example, cautioned against the use of a “capacimeter” for evaluating 
decision-making capacity. They acknowledged the appeal of an instrument that 
could objectively navigate the tension between extending autonomy to those who 
have the ability to make decisions and imposing protective measures on those 
who are unable to make decisions (Kapp & Mossman, 1996).  Despite the 
concerns raised by Kapp and Mossman, as well as others (Kirk & Bersoff, 1996; 
Slobogin, 1996; Stefan, 1996; Weyrauch, 1999) the capacity construct defined by 
Appelbaum and Grisso under the umbrella of the MacArthur Treatment Capacity 
Study has become ubiquitous.   
 The capacity assessment research published by Appelbaum, Grisso, and a 
variety of colleagues (Appelbaum, 2007; Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988; Appelbaum 
& Grisso 1995; Appelbaum, Lidz, & Meisel, 1987 ; Berg et al., 1996; Berg & 
Appelbaum, 2001; Grisso  & Appelbaum, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c, 1996, 1998a, 
1998b; Grisso, Appelbaum, Mulvey, & Fletcher, 1995), Marson and a variety of 
colleagues (Dymek, Atchison, Harrell, & Marson, 2001; Earnst , Marson, & 
Harrell, 2000; Marson, Dymek, & Geyer , 2001; Marson & Harrell, 1999; Marson, 
Annis, McInturff, Bartolucci, & Harrell, 1999; Marson, Chatterjee, Ingram, & 
Harrell, 1996; Marson, Cody, Ingram, & Harrell, 1995; Marson, Earnst, Jamil, 
Bartolucci, & Harrell, 2000; Marson, Hawkins, McInturff, & Harrell, 1997; 
Marson, Ingram,  Cody, & Harrell, 1995; Marson, McInturff, Hawkins, Bartolucci, 
& Harrell, 1997; Marson & Moye, 2007; Marson, Schmitt, Ingram, & Harrell, 
1994; Moye, Butz , Marson, & Wood, 2007; Moye & Marson, 2007), Karlawish 
and a variety of colleagues (Karlawish, 2008, Karlawish, Casarett, James, Xie, & 
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Kim, 2005, Kim , Karlawish, & Caine, 2002), Moye and a variety of colleagues 
(Moye, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2007; Moye, Armesto, & Karel, 2005; Moye, Gurrera, 
Karel, Edelstein, & O'Connell, 2006; Moye, Karel, Azar, & Gurrera, 2004; Moye 
et al., 2008; Moye & Marson, 2007), Karel and a variety of colleagues (Karel, 
Gurrera, Hicken, & Moye, 2010), and others have built a body of literature 
addressing a variety of measures and correlates of capacity.  The few publications 
among these that address what happens after a finding of incapacity have 
directed providers faced with an incapacitated patient to seek a surrogate 
decision maker to make decisions on behalf of the incapacitated patient 
(Appelbaum, 2007; Reuben et al., 2014).  The ethical justification for this 
recommendation is two-fold and involves interplay between beneficence and 
autonomy:  When individuals lack decision-making capacity, the interest in 
protecting those individuals is primary, while the interest in promoting 
autonomy recedes (Appelbaum, Appelbaum, & Grisso, 1998).  This justification is 
consistent with the view that individuals who lack capacity are nonautonomous.   
A somewhat different way to frame the shift to a surrogate is based on the 
concept of precedent autonomy: An individual who appoints an agent through a 
special power of attorney for health care or similar document allows the 
surrogate to exercise autonomy on his or her behalf in the event of a future loss of 
capacity (Francis, 2000). For this framework to effectively protect an individual’s 
autonomy, however, it is necessary for surrogates to promote the individual’s 
preferences.  As discussed below, the research on surrogate decision-making 




Assumptions in the Legal Standards Approach 
Surrogate Decision-Making 
A persistent assumption evident in the capacity assessment literature is 
that the best way to promote the interests of individuals with impaired decisional 
abilities is to replace them with surrogate decision-makers.  Since the publication 
of the President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research report, Making Health Care Decisions 
(1982), substituted judgment has been the gold standard for surrogate decision-
making.  The substituted judgment standard requires a surrogate to make the 
decision that the patient would have made if the patient had the capacity to make 
the decision, considering the values and preferences of the patient that are known 
by the surrogate (Coverdale, McCullough, Molinari, & Workman, 2006).  
Substituted judgment is viewed as more protective of patient autonomy than the 
best interest standard, in which the surrogate chooses the option that the 
surrogate views as being in the patient’s best interest (Francis, 2000). 
Unfortunately, research on surrogate decision-making casts doubt on the 
validity of the assumption that surrogates are able to effectively apply this 
standard.  A meta analysis by Shalowitz, Garrett-Mayer, and Wendler (2006), 
which evaluated 16 studies, 151 hypothetical scenarios, 2,595 surrogate-patient 
pairs, and 19,526 paired patient surrogate responses, revealed that in a third of 
all decisions, the surrogate was unable to accurately predict what the patient 
wanted.  Similarly discouraging were the results of a randomized controlled trial 
that considered the effect of advance directives on a surrogate’s ability to predict 
an older adult’s preferences for care (Ditto & Danks, 2001).  In the study, 
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outpatients (N  = 401) aged 65 and older were randomly assigned to one of five 
groups.  Four interventions were evaluated:  advance health care directives with 
discussion, advance health care directives without discussion, valued life 
activities directives with discussion, and valued life activities directives without 
discussion.  In the control group, 72% of the surrogates accurately predicted the 
patient’s preferences in nine different scenarios.  Surrogates were unable to make 
decisions in accordance with the substituted judgment standard at higher rates, 
even with the support of interventions designed to improve participant 
performance; none of the interventions improved surrogates’ performance.  The 
authors concluded that the study demonstrated the ineffectiveness of 
interventions to improve the quality of substituted judgment (Ditto & Danks, 
2001).  A 2013 study by Gao et al. (2013) found low levels of agreement between 
the end-of-life care approaches preferred by patients and by caregivers making 
decisions on behalf of patients (  = 0.10;  = 2.32, df = 1, p  = 0.13).   
In a study evaluating quality of life judgments, Feinberg and Whitlatch 
(2001) found that surrogate decision-makers’ views of a patient’s quality of life 
were related, but not identical, to the patient’s.  Covinsky et al. (2000) found that 
surrogates were able to predict patient’s preferences only 37% of the time; 
surrogates predicted that patients would “rather die” than live in a nursing 
facility in 14% of the cases where a patient was “very willing” to live in a nursing 
facility.  Still other studies that have shown that older adults’ treatment 
preferences vary over time (Ditto et al., 2003; Fried, O'Leary, Van Ness, & 
Fraenkel, 2007). Shalowitz et al. (2006), called for researchers to investigate new 
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ways to make decisions for patients with diminished capacity that are more likely 
to reflect patient preferences.   
A recent study raises concerns about the ability of caregivers to articulate 
the values of older adults with dementing illness.  Reamy, Kim, Zarit, and 
Whitlatch (2013) found that caregivers became less able to effectively represent 
the interests of older adults in decision-making over time because they de-
emphasized the importance of the older adult’s values and preferences.  The 
caregiver’s quality of life predicted their ratings of the importance of the older 
adult’s values and preferences.   
An implicit assumption of the legal standards approach to capacity is that 
a surrogate decision-maker is better than an impaired patient as representing the 
autonomous preferences of the patient.  These studies cast doubt on that 
assumption.  In turn, the studies reinforce the need to develop a new model of 
decision-making for adults with impaired decisional abilities. 
 
Abilities of Older Adults with Dementia 
There is evidence that individuals with impaired decisional abilities can be 
reliable informants, can consistently report preferences, goals, and values, and 
often wish to be involved in the decision-making process.  Involvement in 
decision-making can improve a variety of outcomes.     
In a study of 99 individuals with dementia Brod, Stewart, Sands, and 
Walton (1999) found that 95 participants were able to respond to a quality-of-life 
questionnaire; 50 of those who were capable of completing the questionnaire had 
a Mini Mental Status Examination (MMSE) score between 13 and 18.  Logsdon 
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and colleagues have published a number of studies in which they have 
demonstrated that many individuals with dementia can respond to a quality-of-
life questionnaire (Logsdon, Gibbons, McCurry, & Teri, 1999; R. G. Logsdon, 
Gibbons, McCurry, & Teri, 2002).  Mak (2011) found that individuals with 
dementia provided reliable information on goal pursuit and purpose in life. 
Whitlatch, Piiparinen, and Feinberg (2009) concluded that individuals with 
dementia were able to report preferences regarding autonomy, burden, social 
relations, and safety/quality of care.  In addition, persons with dementia can 
consistently report demographics, facts, general preferences, involvement in daily 
living, preferences for care, and state-dependent preferences (Clark, Tucke, & 
Whitlatch, 2008; Feinberg & Whitlatch, 2001, 2002; Menne, Tucke, Whitlatch, & 
Feinberg, 2008; Whitlatch, Feinberg, & Tucke, 2005).  Karel, Moye, Bank, and 
Azar (2007), found that individuals with dementia were able to articulate values 
and to respond to a values questionnaire, and responses of individuals with 
dementia were as stable when evaluated 9 months later as the responses of 
individuals who did not have a dementia diagnosis.  When combined, these 
studies provide support for the view that individuals with dementia can provide 
reliable, consistent reports on states and preferences that are relevant to the 
treatment decision-making process. 
 
Benefits of Decision-Making Involvement 
Empirical evidence suggests that greater involvement in decision-making 
is correlated with better health-related outcomes than are found among 
individuals with less involvement, for patients both with and without cognitive 
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impairment. In breast cancer treatment, for example, patient participation in 
decision-making is associated with higher satisfaction with care, better provider 
compliance with quality measures, and improved patient quality of life (Maly, 
Umezawa, Leake, & Silliman, 2004).  Menne, Judge, and Whitlatch (2009) found 
that individuals with dementia who rated their decision-making involvement as 
high also reported higher quality of life. Kasser and Ryan (1999) identified an 
association between reports of greater autonomy and improved psychological 
outcomes, as well as decreased mortality, among nursing home residents.    
Dawson, Powers, Krestar, Yarry, and Judge (2013) showed that, among 
individuals with dementia, higher reported self-efficacy was correlated with 
higher self-rated quality of life. 
In view of a growing body of evidence that supports patient involvement in 
care decisions, the Institute of Medicine in 2001 advocated patient-centered care 
(Institute of Medicine Committee on Quality of Health Care in America, 2001).  
The VA has adopted the Chronic Care model, which is based on the premise that 
“good quality chronic care is characterized by productive interactions between 
informed and activated patients and a prepared, proactive health care team” 
(Rodriguez, Appelt, Switzer, Sonel, & Arnold, 2008, p. 441).  The patient-
centered care that is central to the VA’s Chronic Care Model will demand new 
strategies for including individuals with impaired decisional abilities in decisions 




Preferences for Decision-Making Involvement 
In a study considering the decision-making preferences of individuals with 
dementia, Hirschman and colleagues asked 48 individuals with Alzheimer’s 
disease if they would want to participate in decisions about their care, and 91.7% 
reported that they did; 70% of their paired caregivers thought the person with 
Alzheimer’s disease would want to participate (Hirschman, Joyce, James, Xie, & 
Karlawish, 2005).  The study provided insight into the caregiver/person with 
Alzheimer’s disease dyad that begins to explain how variables such as caregiver 
gender and relationship between the dyad members could influence involvement 
in decisions. Hirschman and colleagues concluded the article by emphasizing the 
importance of exploring further “how patient-caregiver dyads actually make … 
decisions and [how to] improve the process of decision-making” (Hirschman et 
al., 2005, p. 387).   Citing Hirschman’s study, the American College of Physicians, 
along with 10 other medical associations, have endorsed ethical guidelines that 
encourage providers to make clinical encounters “patient-centered, allowing for 
maximum appropriate patient autonomy and participation in decision-making” 
and to support “patients’ ongoing participation about their care” (Mitnick, 
Leffler, & Hood, 2010, p. 256). 
 
Supported Decision-Making 
As with many emerging paradigms, supported decision-making means 
different things to different people in different settings.  This work adopts the 
description used by Kohn, Blumenthal, and Campbell (2013):  Supported 
decision-making is a process wherein an adult with impaired decisional abilities 
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is the ultimate decision-maker, receiving support from one or more individuals or 
entities who assist in making and communicating decisions.  Supported decision-
making necessarily includes the individual in the decision-making process, in 
contrast to substituted judgment, which assumes that the person is unable to be 
included in the decision-making process.  Some supported decision-making 
models involve court proceedings, while others remain informal or lack legal 
enforceability (Gordon, 2000; Kohn et al., 2013; Pathare & Shields, 2012).  
Models are being institutionalized in legislation, such as those in Sweden, British 
Columbia, and Saskatchewan (Surtees, 2010). 
In the U.S., supported decision-making has received little attention in 
court-ordered decision-making structures such as guardianships, where 
substituted judgment dominates, and where an adult would typically lose the 
legal right to make decisions when a court determines that the person needs legal 
protection.  This contrasts with legally recognized supported decision-making 
models that emerged in European countries such as Norway in the 1990s, where 
a court could put a decision-making assistant in place without depriving the 
individual in need of protection of the legal right to make decisions (Blankman, 
1998).  More recently, supported decision-making has been recognized in legal 
structures in the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and Saskatchewan 
(Pathare & Shields, 2012; Surtees, 2010).  The international trend turned away 
from exclusion and toward legal structures designed to preserve adults’ rights to 
make decisions with support when the United Nations passed the game-changing 




Article 12, paragraph 2 of the CRPD states, “Parties shall recognize that 
persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all 
aspects of life” (United Nations, 2006).  The Optimal Protocol for implementing 
the CRPD encourages supported decision-making processes that view the 
individual as the decision-maker, with others in roles such as providing 
explanations to the individual and interpreting the individual’s preferences.  One 
hundred fifty-eight countries (including the U.S.) have signed, and 143 countries 
(excluding the U.S.) have ratified the CRPD.  As one scholar observed, “Article 12 
marks an important paradigm shift from the practice of depriving people of their 
rights simply on the basis of their perceived lack of capacity to the promotion of 
national policies and laws which comport to the goals and principles of the 
CRPD, including autonomy, dignity, and independence” (Kanter, 2008, p. 560).    
While U.S. laws are trending toward increased protection of the rights of 
adults to make their own legal decisions, no state’s guardianship laws are 
designed to put a supported decision-maker in place without removing the adult’s 
legal right to make medical decisions.  A consensus statement developed during 
the Third National Guardianship Summit implicitly endorsed shared decision-
making within the context of guardianship when it stated that guardians have the 
obligation to “help the person express his or her goals,” Symposium, Third 
National Guardianship Sum m it Standards and Recom m endations, 2012 Utah 
Law Review 1191 (2012).   Regulations from the U.S. Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) characterized “person-centered planning” as a 
supported decision-making process that could be used for adults with impaired 
decisional abilities both inside and outside of a legal guardianship structure.  
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According to CMS, an individual with impaired decisional abilities “directs the 
[decision-making] process, with assistance as needed or desired from a 
representative of the individual’s choosing”  42 C.F.R. 440.167 (2011).  This 
decision-making approach “is intended to identify the strengths, capacities, 
preferences, needs, and desired measurable outcomes of the individual.”  The 
decision-making companion should be “freely chosen by the individual” 42 C.F.R. 
440.167 (2011).   
The increasing emphasis on person-directed healthcare and the rights of 
adults with disabilities dovetail with emerging emphasis on supported decision-
making, even in the absence of the legal structures that support the concept in 
Canada and other countries.  Although Kohn and colleagues (2013) describe the 
evidence for supported decision-making as “meager” (p. 1135), the concept is 
supported both in theory, as discussed in the next section, and by the empirical 
evidence of the harms caused when individuals are excluded from decisions and 
the benefits of inclusions, discussed above. 
 
Theory 
Two theories are relevant to considering models for addressing the 
decision-making needs of older adults with impaired decisional abilities, but 
none is entirely adequate for the purpose of supporting model development.  
Theories that are relevant to treatment decision-making for individuals with 




Stress Process Model 
Menne and colleagues have used a modified stress process model to 
explain decision-making involvement among older adults with dementia (Menne 
et al., 2009; Menne & Whitlatch, 2007).  The stress process model addresses the 
role of relationships between care receivers and caregivers, the role of social 
factors that influence stress in chronic illness, and the role of moderators in 
making the stress of chronic illness better or worse (Judge, Menne, & Whitlatch, 
2010).  The stress process model was used in these studies to identify factors that 
can predict quality of life so that interventions to improve quality of life might be 
targeted at those factors (Menne et al., 2009).  Decision-making involvement has 
been shown to predict quality of life in the studies, but the stress process model 
does not provide guidance on the ethical and practical issues that must be 
addressed in developing a model of decision-making inclusion.  
 
Self-Determination Theory 
Self-determination theory supports the need for a model of decision-
making inclusion.  Deci and Ryan’s self-determination theory suggests that 
autonomy, perception of competence, and relatedness are essential psychological 
needs that environment and interpersonal relationships can either foster or 
frustrate (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2001).  If these needs are not met, 
self-determination theory predicts that poor health, conflict, and distress result 
(Kasser & Ryan, 1999).  Like the stress process model, self-determination theory 
supports the development of an inclusive decision-making model, but it does not 
help to resolve the ethical and practical issues in developing the model.  Self-
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determination theory supports the move toward person-centered treatment 
decision-making, which in turn, supports the use of supported decision-making. 
 
Development of a Novel Model for Inclusive Decision-Making 
Self-determination theory and the stress process model are relevant to 
questions about decision-making.  They do not, however, answer questions about 
the balance between self-direction and protection, the legal and practical 
demands of the informed consent process, and the role of other individuals (e.g., 
family members or friends) in the decision-making process.  Addressing these 
questions will require a more thorough understanding of health care decision-
making from the perspective of the individual, other involved nonprofessionals, 
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methods used in this study.  
Under Aim 1, an analysis was conducted to determine whether the current 
approach to capacity assessment is consistent with ethical objectives of informed 
consent.  To achieve this aim, an historical review of capacity assessment was 
conducted, focusing on the mid-1940s through the present.  The current system 
was then evaluated in light of emerging empirical evidence about the benefits of 
including people in decisions about their lives, and shifting views of how to 
ethically address the needs of people with disabilities.  Finally, future directions 
in capacity assessment and decision-making for people with impaired decisional 
abilities were discussed. 
The study was conducted to evaluate the validity and reliability of the 
Modified Control Preference Scale (MCPS) as a measure of decision-making 
preferences for older adults representing a range of cognitive function (Aim 2).  
Studies characterizing older adults’ decision-involvement preferences have 
typically excluded individuals with impaired cognitive function, as measured by 
cognitive screening instruments or diagnosis (Nolan et al., 2005).  Studies 
evaluating the experiences of individuals with dementia typically use proxy 
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reports from caregivers (Beard & Neary, 2013), not the views of the individuals, 
because people with dementia are “deemed incapable … of even narrating their 
own experience of illness” (p. 131).    
This study used validated instruments to elicit decision-making 
preferences of older adults across a range of cognitive function, including 
individuals who would likely be judged to lack decisional capacity under the legal 
standards approach described in Chapter 2.  In addition, semistructured 
interview questions guided by cognitive interviewing techniques were asked to 
elicit narrative descriptions of participants’ preferences.  Quantitative and 
qualitative data were analyzed to determine whether the use of the MCPS was 
valid and reliable in the study population. 
Participants’ decision-making preferences were described (Aim 3) using 
their responses to the MCPS and their responses to semistructured interview 
questions.  A finding that participants’ preferences for involvement are 
incompatible with a decision-making model that categorically excludes 
individuals with impaired decisional abilities from decisions about their care 
would support the need for further research to serve as the foundation for a new 
model that involves individuals with impaired decisional abilities in decisions 
about their care.  
Older adults with impaired decisional abilities have been excluded from 
studies about decision-making preferences in the past. An understanding of the 
preferences of individuals whose role in treatment decision-making may be 
limited by the legal standards approach to defining decision-making capacity can 
help guide the development of a model of inclusive decision-making. 
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Specific Aim 1:  Methods 
Describe the history  and theory  of capacity  assessm ent, and explore 
w hether the current approach to capacity  assessm ent achieves the ethical 
objectives of inform ed consent doctrine.   
To understand the origins of the current model of treatment decision-
making capacity, the first step was to trace the history and theory of decisional 
capacity and the emerging field of capacity assessment.  First, the seminal article 
on the subject, Constructing Com petence: Form ulating Standards of Legal 
Com petence to Make Medical Decisions, by Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso (1996), 
was reviewed, as well as cases, statutes, research studies, and ethics texts that 
were cited in the article.  The purpose of the review and analysis was to describe 
how the authors used case and statutory law, as well as ethical principles, to 
identify the four elements of the legal standards approach to defining and 
assessing capacity.   
Two articles by Meisel, Roth, and Lidz, Tow ard a Model of the Legal 
Doctrine of Inform ed Consent (1977) and Tests of Com petency  to Consent to 
Treatm ent (1977), were predecessors to the article by Berg et al. (1996).  Again, 
cases, law review articles, and ethics texts cited in these articles were reviewed 
and analyzed.  The focus of the analysis remained on the use of case and statutory 
law to strike a balance between autonomy and beneficence.  Additional research 
included the review of original sources cited by Roth, Meisel and Lidz, as well as 
Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso. 
A primary focus of the analysis was the ethical principles of autonomy and 
beneficence.  In addition to traditional considerations, such as Kantian notions of 
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autonomy, more recent conceptualizations were considered, such as Secker’s 
view that beneficence requires the promotion of autonomy (Secker, 1999a, 
1999b).  The role of capacity in informed consent doctrine was also considered.  
After describing the legal and ethical framework of capacity, assumptions 
that are implicit, and occasionally explicit, in the legal standards approach to 
characterizing capacity were identified and discussed.  For example, the 
assumption that a surrogate applying a substituted judgment standard can best 
address the decision-making needs of an individual with impaired decisional 
abilities was explored.  Research studies addressing the abilities of people with 
dementia and the benefits of decision involvement were then considered in 
evaluating the assumptions.  Finally, the sparse literature on supported decision-
making was explored to consider whether supported decision-making could serve 
as an effective alternative to the current dichotomous approach to capacity 
assessment. 
 
Specific Aims 2 and 3 
Rationale 
The measurement of decision-making capacity using the legal standards 
paradigm has been extensively studied (Moye, Marson, & Edelstein, 2013).  
Studies have focused on the relationships between various measures of cognitive 
function and measures of capacity.  The next step – replacing the “incapacitated” 
patient with a surrogate decision-maker – has received little attention.  There is a 
dearth of research on (1) whether older adults with impaired decisional abilities 
would want to be involved in making treatment decisions, (2) if they did want to 
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be involved, how they would want to be involved in the decisions, and (3) how 
they would perceive exclusion from the decision-making process.  If individuals 
with impaired decisional abilities want to be involved in treatment decisions, and 
if supporting their involvement were beneficial to their wellbeing and therefore 
supported by the ethical principle of beneficence, further research, along with 
changes in law, policy, and clinical guidelines should be considered.   
Most studies assessing decision involvement preferences exclude older 
adults with dementia or those with a score on the Short Portable Mental Status 
Questionnaire (SPMSQ) (Pfeiffer, 1975), Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) 
(Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), or Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) 
(Nasreddine et al., 2005) below a set cut point.  This portion of the study 
evaluated whether instruments validated for use in other populations of adults 
would effectively, reliably, and validly captured the decision-involvement 
preferences of older adults across a range of cognitive function.  
 
Design 
Employing a mixed methods design, this study used a modified Control 
Preference Scale (MCPS) (Degner et al., 1997; Nolan et al., 2005) and 
semistructured interviews guided by cognitive interviewing techniques to elicit 
participants’ preferences.  Mixed methods are used to study the phenomenon 
because “different aspects of reality lend themselves to different methods of 
inquiry” (Sandelowski, 2000a, p. 247).  Health care decision-making is a very 
complex interaction between patient and provider, and in the geriatric 
population, the complexity is compounded further by the presence of one or more 
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individuals such as an appointed health care agent, family member, or friend 
(Kapp, 1991).  This complicated interaction will be most effectively described and 
clarified by combining research methods, as described below. 
 
Sample 
A convenience sample of participants residing in two assisted living 
facilities and three nursing homes were recruited.  Attempts to recruit 
participants in a hospital setting and a geriatrics out-patient clinic, and through a 
newsletter on Alzheimer’s Disease research were unsuccessful.  Facilities were 
selected because they were expected to have a substantial number of eligible 
participants, but differences were expected between individuals living in different 
types of settings.   
The sample was larger than a typical qualitative study, where researchers 
recruit participants until saturation is reached and no new themes emerge.  At 
the same time, the sample was small for a quantitative study, where a smaller 
sample has less power to detect significant differences among participants.  A 
sample size exceeding 35 was thought to be sufficient for a preliminary 
descriptive study including a statistical evaluation of relationships between 
individuals and groups and within subjects.  In retrospect, the sample appears to 
have been adequate because major themes repeated, with no new themes 
emerging, prior to the final interview.  As discussed below, significant 
relationships and differences were found among a number of variables.  
Individuals were considered for participation if, according to their health 
record and/or the judgment of facility personnel and/or the investigator, they 
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were age 65 or older and English-speaking, had sensory, physical, and cognitive 
function sufficient to participate in the interview, and were currently free from 
active mental illness or chemical dependency.   
A contact person at each site reviewed a list of residents and identified 
residents who were viewed as meeting inclusion criteria.  A total of 62 individuals 
were invited to participate. Nineteen declined to participate for a 31% refusal 
rate.  Among those who began the consent process, three were judged by the 
researcher to lack sufficient understanding of the nature of the study to provide 
informed consent to participate, discussed further below, and two with acute 
illnesses were unable to stay awake through the consent process.  Thirty-eight 
participants were enrolled in the study, but one withdrew before completing the 
demographic questionnaire due to a scheduling conflict.  See Figure 3.1.  
Reasons for declining to participate included fatigue, pain, and scheduling 
conflicts, but the majority of individuals who did not participate did not provide a 
reason.   
Throughout the consent process and interviews, participants were offered 
the opportunity to stop the interview if signs of physical or emotional distress 
were observed.  Two individuals declined to complete the MoCA due to pain and 
fatigue.   
The sample was influenced by the judgment of the facility staff, 
consequently there was a risk referrals would exclude individuals who the contact 
person viewed as lacking the ability to participate, but who could have 
participated.  All of the facilities either referred people who were found to be 
unable to participate, or whose cognitive abilities were substantially impaired; 
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the interviewer did not see evidence that facilities screened out eligible 
participants.  In addition, there was a risk that the contact person might not have 
referred individuals viewed as being critical of the facility.  Participants at all but 
one facility expressed frustration or criticism about the facility or policies, and 
one or more participants at three of five facilities were very critical.  Again, there 
was no evidence that individuals were not referred because they had criticisms of 
the facilities. 
Even if referrals were not deliberately biased, there were likely biases in 
the study population.  An interview estimated to take about 1 hour is both 
physically and cognitively demanding, and would have excluded individuals who 
viewed themselves as unable to meet that demand.  The study involved only 
individuals residing in facilities, not individuals living in their homes without 
support, which affected some findings. 
The study protocol provided for oversampling individuals with impaired 
cognitive function if more than 15 of the participants recruited had no known 
cognitive impairment.  As noted in the results section, 34 of 37 participants had a 
positive screening test for cognitive impairment, so oversampling was 
unnecessary. 
 
Human Subjects Protection and Informed Consent 
The study was approved by the University of Utah Institutional Review 
Board.  In accordance with the study protocols, consent was obtained by the 
investigator, an elder law attorney with training and experience in medical ethics, 
consenting participants for research studies, and evaluating the capacity of adults 
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with cognitive impairment according to a range of legal standards.  In addition to 
reading the IRB-approved consent form to participants, the investigator asked 
participants to explain, in their own words, the risks and benefits of participation, 
and describe what study participation would require of them.  The investigator 
considered whether potential participants had the requisite ability to 
communicate, and to rationally evaluate, understand, and appreciate the nature 
of the study, their role in the study, and the risks and benefits of participating in 
the study (Grisso, Appelbaum, Mulvey, & Fletcher, 1995).  For example, a 
potential participant who was approached was not enrolled when she expressed 
the desire to help, but was unable to demonstrate an understanding of how her 
participation would contribute to the study, even after different explanations 
were provided.  Throughout the consent process and interviews, participants 
were offered the opportunity to stop the interview if signs of physical or 
emotional distress were observed.   
 
Setting 
Interviews were conducted in quiet locations selected by the participant, 
such as conference rooms or the participant’s room.  In some instances, 
interviews were conducted in quiet public areas, such as the dining room between 
meal times, or other areas selected by the participant.   
 
Measures 
The following instruments were used in the study: 
  Modified Control Preference Scale (MCPS) 
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  Satisfaction with Decision Scale (SDS) 
  Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) 
These instruments, procedures for use, and analysis are described in detail in 
Chapters 6 and 7.  In addition, the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, Usual 
Source of Care Questionnaire (2010) was used to generate a description of the 
role of a decision companion.  The question series helped provide structure to the 
portion of the interview designed to elicit information about the role of a 
companion, but the data were not analyzed or reported because many questions 
were irrelevant to individuals living in residential settings.   
 
Procedures  
After they provided demographic information, participants were asked to 
identify a person or persons involved in making decisions about their healthcare, 
and for participants who had a person involved, the Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Usual Source of Care questions were asked, to the degree they were relevant. 
Participants were then asked to identify an instance where they were involved in 
a treatment decision (the “target decision”) and to provide details about the 
decision that was made and how it was carried out.  The SDS was then 
administered, with the participant asked to focus on the target encounter when 
asking the questions.  After two individuals who were unable identify a target 
encounter were not asked the SDS, the remainder of participants who could not 
describe a target encounter were asked to respond to the SDS questions as they 
applied to a typical doctor’s appointment.  
56 
 
Participants with sight were provided with a visual representation of the 
MCPS items for eliciting their relationship with the physician, as shown in Figure 
3.2.  Probing questions were asked, for example, if the participant said, “I make 
the decisions” without clearly indicating one of the options, they were directed to 
the visual representation and asked, “Did you seriously consider your doctor’s 
opinions before making the decisions, or do you make decisions on your own?”  If 
the participant’s choice between options was ambiguous, questioning would 
proceed in this manner.   
Participants were then asked to set aside the target encounter and instead 
describe the perfect decision-making encounter.  If a participant appeared to be 
fatigued or frustrated or irritated at the question series, and if the prior responses 
suggested that the answer would be the same as it was for the first question 
series, the question was framed as a comparison with the past encounter.  For 
example, a participant was asked, “Would the perfect decision-making process be 
the same as the process you described for the decision to operate on your knee?”  
If the response was anything other than unconditional affirmation, then the 
question series was repeated.  The same series was repeated, but with a focus on 
the decision companion.  At the conclusion of both question series, participants 
were asked if the CPS accurately captured their view of the decision-making 
process, and were asked to describe what was not captured. 
Participants were then asked what the doctor should consider in forming 
opinions about treatment.  If they were unsure, prompts would be given such as 
the following: “Are there things about you, about how you live your life, that the 
doctor should consider?” and “Some people think it is important that the doctor 
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think about their religious or spiritual values, the cost of treatment, or whether 
treatment might affect their ability to live where they live now.  Would you want 
your doctor to consider any of these?”  Participants were then asked to report 
how they weigh input from the physician and companion.  At the end of the 
interview, all participants were asked if there was anything else about their 
decision-making process that they wanted to share. 
To understand how the participants want to engage with the physician in 
making decisions, participants were asked at the end of the interview in 
semistructured questions if they would want a physician to disclose information 
about a foreseeable characteristic of a newly diagnosed serious illness or side 
effects of a treatment for a new or existing illness.  Types of information included 
physical side effects such as nausea or pain, functional impairment, such as 
inability to walk, and cognitive impairment such as the inability to recognize 
people or confusion, and life expectancy.  Like the Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Survey, the questions generated narrative descriptions of participant experiences 
and preferences, but specific responses were not reported. 
Participants were invited to provide the name and contact information of 
the decision companion in order to obtain the companion’s understanding of the 
participant’s preferences.  This portion of the study was discontinued when none 
of the first 10 companions responded to voicemail messages or emails inviting 
their participation.   
The MoCA was administered at the end of the interview.  




Data Organization and Analysis 
Data organization and analysis relevant to Aim 2 are described in detail in 
Chapter 5, and data organization and analysis relevant to Aim 3 are described in 
detail in Chapter 6.   
 
Study Limitations 
This study has a number of limitations.  The sample size was small, so 
generalizability is limited.  The small sample size also limited the ability to 
observe significant relationships among variables.  Participants all lived in 
residential settings in a Mountain West state; individuals in community settings 
may view the issues explored differently from those in residential settings.  
Participants were overwhelmingly White, and were, on average, highly educated; 
there may have been selection bias due to referrals and self-selection.  It is 
possible that individuals who declined to participate viewed their roles in the 
decision-making process differently from those who enrolled in the study due to 
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USING SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING TO ACHIEVE THE  
ETHICAL OBJECTIVES OF INFORMED CONSENT  




The Washington Post story opened, “In a victory for the rights of adults 
with disabilities, a judge declared Friday that a 29-year-old woman with Down 
syndrome can live the life she wants, rejecting a guardianship request from her 
parents that would have allowed them to keep her in a group home against her 
will” (Vargas, 2013). Although Jenny Hatch was a young woman, the court’s 
ruling may influence how medical treatment decisions are made for adults with 
impaired decisional abilities across all ages and across intellectual, cognitive, and 
psychosocial disabilities.    
Adults have ethical and legal rights to make their own healthcare 
decisions; these rights are anchored in the legal presumption that all adults have 
the capacity to make their own healthcare decisions.  Some adults, however, have 
cognitive, emotional, or psychological impairments that affect their ability to 
make healthcare decisions.  When an adult is fully unable to engage in decision-
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making (for example, a person in a coma) healthcare decisions will necessarily be 
made by surrogate decision-makers on behalf of the adult, in accordance with an 
advance healthcare directive, or a combination of the two. There are few 
alternatives for addressing decision-making, so these cases are reasonably 
straightforward. 
The hard cases are those when a person is affected by disability such as 
those caused by neurodegenerative diseases, traumatic or organic brain injury, or 
other accident or illness that impacts healthcare decision-making abilities, but 
does not render the person fully unable to participate in the decision-making 
process.  This article focuses on the cases that involve adults whose decision-
making ability is in the gray area because they retain some abilities but have a 
level of impaired function that raises concerns about their ability to provide 
informed consent for treatment or treatment refusal.   The article contains a 
description of a research and policy agenda that would support the development 
of a high-quality system of supported decision-making for individuals with 
impaired decision-making abilities as an alternative to the current system, which 
relies on surrogates to make decisions on behalf of individuals with impaired 
decisional abilities.  
 
The Legal Standards Paradigm 
Background 
The assessment of healthcare decision-making capacity arises in the 
context of the ethical and legal obligation to obtain informed consent from an 
individual prior to providing medical treatment.  The purpose of informed 
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consent is to enable patients to make knowledgeable, autonomous decisions 
about medical tests and treatments.  Underlying informed consent doctrine is the 
view that patients are in the best position to decide what treatment is right for 
them.  
 
Capacity: The Balancing Point Between Autonomy and Beneficence 
There is widespread agreement that, for consent to be valid, an individual 
must have the capacity to make healthcare decisions.  Providers should consider 
the decisional capacity of their patients, either explicitly or implicitly, during 
every health care encounter (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988).  There is a heightened 
obligation to evaluate capacity when there is reason to suspect impairment, such 
as a diagnosis that would affect judgment or other cognitive function.  Healthcare 
decisions that require consent range from simple diagnostic procedures to the 
most fundamental and personal decisions in life, including choices affecting the 
timing and circumstances of death.   
To make capacity determinations, providers must make  “judgments about 
patients' interests based on applications of the values of autonomy and 
beneficence” (Grisso & Appelbaum, 1996, p. 169). Kasser and Ryan (1999) 
defined autonomy as “volition – the sense that one’s behavior emanates from and 
is endorsed by oneself” (p. 937).  Although volumes have been written about 
autonomy back to the Greek philosophers, this paper will adopt the 1999 Kasser 
and Ryan definition.  An autonomous action could be a major decision about 
treatment for serious illness or a decision to play bingo without coercion (Kasser 
& Ryan, 1999).  According to the legal standards approach to capacity 
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assessment, described below in detail, providers are obliged to respect autonomy 
only when they find that an individual has decisional capacity, because 
individuals who fail to demonstrate the elements of capacity are “non-
autonomous” (Berg, Appelbaum, & Grisso, 1996).   
In contrast to autonomy, the ethical principle of beneficence is a 
“normative … moral obligation to act for the benefit of others, helping them to 
further their important and legitimate interests, often by preventing or removing 
possible harms” (Beauchamp, 2008, p. 1).   Behind this normative obligation is “a 
family of overlapping virtues” (Ashcroft, 2007, p. 22), including kindness, 
generosity, loyalty, altruism, love, and “readiness to render effective help to 
others in an emergency” (Beauchamp, 2008, p. 2).  As typically characterized in 
the capacity assessment literature, beneficence justifies a suspension of the right 
to autonomy.  Appelbaum and Grisso (1988), for example, described the process 
of capacity assessment in a 1988 publication as a balance between autonomy and 
beneficence, defined in this case as protection against “bad decisions”; nearly 20 
years later, Appelbaum (2007) still described the process of capacity assessment 
as balancing autonomy against protection.   
The legal standards paradigm developed by Appelbaum and Grisso, 
building on the earlier work of Roth, Meisel and Lidz (1977), created an 
operational definition for the point on the spectrum of decisional capacity where 
autonomy outweighs beneficence.  According to the paradigm, people have the 
capacity to provide informed consent to treatment when they can demonstrate 
four capabilities: the ability to communicate a choice, understand relevant 
information, appreciate the situation and its consequences, and reason about 
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treatment options (Appelbaum, 2007).  Appelbaum and Grisso developed the 
MacArthur Capacity Assessment Test for Treatment to measure patients’ capacity 
and identify those patients who would, under the legal standards paradigm, be 
judged to lack decisional capacity. 
A seminal article by Berg, Appelbaum, and Grisso (1996) explained the 
origins of legal standards definition of capacity, which was derived primarily 
from an extensive review of state statutory and case law, commentary, and ethics 
literature.  The four criteria were derived from criteria considered by courts, or 
under statutes, in cases where an individual’s ability to make a decision – 
sometimes medical, sometimes concerning mental health treatment, and 
sometimes in an entirely different domain such as the capacity to stand trial – 
was in question.  Scholars drew from areas other than the capacity to consent to 
medical treatment because the doctrine of informed consent and capacity to 
consent was still evolving when the legal standards approach was being 
articulated (Meisel et al., 1977; Roth et al., 1977).  
The legal standards paradigm and the work leading up to the publication 
of the 1996 article moved the state of capacity assessment in a positive direction 
in two respects.  In earlier times, both physicians and judges commonly viewed 
individuals as lacking capacity based on diagnosis alone.  The legal standards 
paradigm adopted a more nuanced approach when it defined capacity in terms of 
functional abilities, directly linking the concept of capacity and the downstream 
results of a determination of incapacity to specific demands of the decision-
making process and specific abilities.  Studies demonstrated that fewer 
individuals would be excluded from decisions about their care under the 
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functional approach to capacity (Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; Grisso & 
Appelbaum, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c) than the diagnosis-based approach to capacity.  
Second, the legal standards paradigm acknowledged that whole persons were not 
incapacitated; rather, patients had or lacked capacity to make particular 
decisions based on the demands of the decision-making process (Berg et al., 
1996). The legal standards approach continues to dominate the decision-making 
capacity literature and research, as reflected in a comprehensive overview of the 
current state of capacity assessment by Moye, Marson, and Edelstein (2013).   
After a Finding of Incapacity 
It is widely agreed that the legal standards paradigm moved the evaluation 
of capacity in a positive direction, as evidenced in part by its widespread embrace 
among clinicians, guidelines, and even the ethics literature.  Scores of studies 
have started with the legal standards framework to characterize rates of 
incapacity by disease and evaluate instruments for assessing capacity.  There has 
been a lack of attention, however, to what happens after an individual is found to 
lack the capacity to make a particular decision.   
According to the legal standards paradigm, the first step after finding 
impaired decisional abilities is to evaluate whether disabilities can be treated, 
restoring the person’s capacity to make healthcare decisions (Appelbaum, 2007).  
Individuals should not be excluded from a decision-making process because of a 
disability that can be treated or overcome, whether due to a medical issue such as 
low oxygen levels or a sensory disability, such as hearing or vision loss.  
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Unfortunately, providers are only rarely reminded about this obligation in the 
capacity assessment literature.   
Once a provider has found that a patient lacks capacity to make a decision 
and has concluded that the illness or disability adversely affecting capacity is not 
treatable, then the legal standards paradigm directs the provider to find a 
surrogate to make decisions on behalf of the patient, follow an advance directive, 
or a combination of the two (Appelbaum, 2007; Reuben et al., 2014).  The patient 
is now viewed as a “non-autonomous [sic]” actor with respect to the decision 
being made (Berg et al., 1996).   
Under the legal standards paradigm, those patients whose capacity is 
barely adequate to pass a capacity evaluation are viewed as fully autonomous 
decision-makers.  Patients who barely fail a capacity evaluation are not entitled to 
any say in their medical decisions, without regard to the importance of the 
decision to their lives or their desire to remain involved in the decision-making 
process.   
 
Conceptualizing Capacity as a Dichotomous State 
The legal standards paradigm emphasizes the need to view capacity as a 
dichotomous state:  Every patient either has or lacks the capacity to make every 
treatment decision.  The paradigm’s emphasis on the need for a dichotomous 
judgment makes sense, given that the source of the legal standards paradigm is 
case and statutory law.  Cases that make it into the law books usually end with a 
dichotomous judgment, and statutory law, which echoes case law, will in turn be 
influenced by the emphasis on a dichotomous outcome in case law.  The 
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dichotomous view of capacity is also supported by well-respected ethicists, Brock 
and Buchannan, in Deciding for Others (1989), one of the most important texts 
on surrogate decision-making ever published.  
From the time the legal standards paradigm was described, however, 
scholars have raised concerns about the conceptualization and application of its 
dichotomous structure. In expressing caution about developing instruments 
designed to provide a dichotomous judgment about capacity, Kapp and Mossman 
wrote, “Assuming that cognitively impaired persons must fall into this or that bin 
may be the wrong way to conceptualize their limitations” (1996, p. 88).  They 
suggested that capacity should instead be viewed as a “fuzzy concept” that is “not 
readily amenable to Aristotelian, either-or specifications” (p. 88).  Even if the 
dichotomous view of capacity is theoretically defensible (it is not the purpose of 
this paper to prove or disprove the point, rather it will be accepted as true for the 
purpose of discussion), it may be necessary to set aside the dichotomous view of 
capacity because actions that follow from the approach may harm the individuals 
whom the capacity requirement is meant to protect.   
The legal standards view of capacity as a dichotomous judgement is 
represented in Figure 4.1, which shows that, after decision-making ability 
declines beyond a given point, a person is viewed as having no capacity.  Figure 
4.1 helps to illustrate three challenges presented by a dichotomous capacity 
structure.  First, there will be unavoidable error because of the difficulty of 
correctly placing the person on the capacity line.  How different are the 
individuals represented by points A and B from one another?  Are the differences 
meaningful?  This challenge is reflected in high error rates found in capacity 
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assessment studies, discussed below.  Second, consensus is lacking about where 
the capacity line should be drawn. For example, advocates for adults with 
disabilities might put the line on the far right side of the figure, while family 
caregivers who fear that poor decisions are being made by a parent with 
moderate dementia might put the line further to the left side. Third, the 
dichotomous structure that separates and treats patient A dramatically different 
from patient B likely under-supports and over-burdens patient A, who is judged 
to have capacity, and over-supports and under-involves patient B, who is judged 
to lack capacity.  It is likely that neither result will be beneficent. 
Shortly after the publication of the articles describing and defending the 
legal standards paradigm, a number of scholars voiced concerns (Kapp & 
Mossman, 1996; Kirk & Bersoff, 1996; Slobogin, 1996).  More recently, the 
capacity assessment literature itself has acknowledged the challenge of applying a 
dichotomous standard (American Psychological Association, 2008). 
A publication by the American Psychological Association and the 
American Bar Association acknowledged the tension that arises when capacity is 
judged as a “‘binary’ or ‘dichotomous’ state” when it operates in practice “as more 
of a continuous variable” (American Psychological Association, 2008, p. 28).  The 
publication included a figure that visually represented “clinical capacity” as a 
continuous variable, and “capacity judgment” as a dichotomous variable.  The 
publication, written for psychologists evaluating capacity for guardianship 
proceedings, directed psychologists to “consider all the data and offer an opinion 
as to whether the data, considered in the context of values, risks, and 
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enhancements, lean more in favor of or against the person’s capacity” (p. 29) and 
to offer a “clear opinion” about capacity.   
In an empirical study published in 1997, five physicians who were 
specialists in geriatric psychiatry, geriatric medicine, and neurology were asked 
to rate the capacity of patients with mild Alzheimer’s disease.  These were 
patients who would hover around the capacity line in Figure 4.1.  The physicians 
agreed that a patient had or lacked capacity only 56% of the time (Marson, 
McInturff, Hawkins, Bartolucci, & Harrell, 1997).  In a later intervention study, 
five similarly experienced physicians were trained in the legal standards for 
assessing capacity prior to evaluating capacity of patients with mild or moderate 
Alzheimer’s disease.  The mean agreement among physician judgments increased 
to 76%, although agreement among physicians on the appreciation standard was 
67%, and in 12% of the cases the physicians did not even agree with one another 
about whether the participants had evidenced a choice (Marson, Earnst, Jamil, 
Bartolucci, & Harrell, 2000).  Although findings in the second study were 
characterized as showing “significant agreement” after physicians were trained 
on the legal standards, there has not been a serious conversation about whether a 
system that results in one in four people being misjudged by a small group of 
experts is an acceptable error rate when the result of that determination is the 
loss of fundamental rights.  In practice, even now, agreement among physicians 
may be even lower than the 56% reported in the study described above.  In 
contrast to the physicians participating in the Marson study, most physicians who 
care for older patients with impaired decisional abilities are not geriatricians 
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(Landefeld, Callahan, & Woolard, 2003), geriatric psychiatrists, or neurologists, 
and few physicians receive training in capacity assessment.   
Volicer and Ganzini found evidence of widespread misunderstanding 
among physicians about decisional capacity, including wide variation in the 
criteria for assessing capacity that were considered by providers who conduct 
capacity assessments, including psychiatrists, geriatricians, and chairs of VA 
Medical Center Ethics Advisory Committees.  Particularly troubling was the fact 
that half of the providers responding to a poll selected “making decision that 
seems reasonable” as an element of decision-making capacity, even though 
reasonableness is not a required element for capacity in either law or ethics 
(Volicer & Ganzini, 2003).  In a related study, providers rated the frequency of 
concerns about capacity assessment.  Ninety-two percent of respondents said that 
it was common or very common that practitioners do “not understand that 
capacity (or incapacity) is not ‘all or nothing’ but specific to a decision.”  Further, 
66% rated as common or very common that “Practioner assumes that if a patient 
has a diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease or another dementia, even if mild, the 
patient lacks capacity for making all medical decisions” (Ganzini, Volicer, Nelson, 
& Derse, 2003, p. 239). 
Despite an extensive literature review, the author found no published 
studies exploring how the misunderstandings described above affect the 
individuals who are erroneously evaluated as having or lacking capacity under 




Implications of the Legal Standards Paradigm 
Is Routine Exclusion from Decision-Making Beneficent? 
Even if it were possible to eliminate all error from capacity 
determinations, the author has found no evidence that it is a beneficent act to 
replace those who are found to meet the legal standards definition of capacity 
with surrogate decision-makers.  To the contrary, there is evidence that exclusion 
may cause harm or fail to promote wellbeing.   
Numerous studies have shown that patient involvement in healthcare 
decision-making is associated with better health-related outcomes across patient 
populations. In breast cancer treatment, for example, patient participation in 
decision-making is associated with higher satisfaction with care, better provider 
compliance with quality measures, and improved patient quality of life (Maly, 
Umezawa, Leake, & Silliman, 2004).  In view of a growing body of evidence that 
supports patient involvement in care decisions, the Institute of Medicine in 2001 
called for patient-centered care (IOM Committee on Quality of Health Care in 
America., 2001).  The VA has adopted the Chronic Care model, based on the 
premise that “good quality chronic care is characterized by productive 
interactions between informed and activated patients and a prepared, proactive 
health care team” (Rodriguez, Appelt, Switzer, Sonel, & Arnold, 2008).   
There is no evidence for a defined point in the progression of cognitive 
decline associated with Alzheimer’s disease, for example, where excluding a 
person who wants to participate in decisions is a beneficent act.  However, there 
would be widespread agreement that there are many specific instances where it 
would be beneficent to honor a specific request.  For example, few people would 
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endorse honoring the request of a patient who is declining an intervention that 
would achieve the patient’s goals of care because paranoia related to Alzheimer’s 
disease makes the patient fear all medical treatment. The legal standards 
paradigm does not, however, confine the recommendation that surrogates be 
substituted as decision-makers in such cases.  Rather it categorically 
recommends substitution by a surrogate in every case where a patient is found to 
fail to meet the legal standard for capacity.  
While there is no evidence that replacing a person who fails to meet the 
legal standard with a surrogate is beneficial to a person with impaired capacity, 
there is evidence that individuals with dementia retain sufficient awareness to 
know when they are being excluded from their care decisions, and on average, 
they do not want to be excluded.  Individuals with dementia reported in one 
study that they felt left out of the process of planning for their care (Brod, 
Stewart, Sands, & Walton, 1999), and in another, that they did not have sufficient 
involvement in decision-making (Cohen, 1991) and did not receive the 
information they wanted about medical care and support options (Beisecker, 
Chrisman & Wright, 1997).   
Self-determination theory and the stress process model help to explain 
why excluding individuals from decisions about their care would likely be 
detrimental.  Self-determination theory suggests that autonomy, perception of 
competence, and relatedness are essential psychological needs that environment 
and interpersonal relationships can either foster or frustrate (Deci & Ryan, 1985; 
Ryan & Deci, 2001).  When these needs are not met, self-determination theory 
predicts that poor health, conflict, and distress result (Kasser & Ryan, 1999).  
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Depriving people of autonomy is associated with poorer measures of wellbeing, 
while autonomy support, defined as “the extent to which people feel supported in 
their ability to function autonomously, be choiceful, and make decisions,” is 
related to higher psychological wellbeing among elderly patients in nursing 
homes (Kasser & Ryan, 1999, p. 938).   
Whitlatch, Menne, and Judge have used a modified stress process model 
to predict the effects of decision-making involvement among older adults with 
dementia (Menne, Judge & Whitlatch, 2009; Menne & Whitlatch, 2007).  The 
stress process model addresses the role of relationships between care receivers 
and caregivers, the role of social factors that influence stress in chronic illness, 
and the role of moderators in making the stress of chronic illness better or worse 
(Judge, Menne, & Whitlatch, 2010).  The research suggests that both the 
individuals with dementia and their caregivers can benefit when the individual 
with dementia participates in making routine decisions (Menne, Johnson, & 
Whitlatch, 2008; Menne, Judge, & Whitlatch, 2009), although the studies did not 
address treatment decision-making. 
Some older adults decline to participate in decisions about their care. In 
one of the very few studies where older adults with dementia were asked about 
their preferences for involvement in healthcare decisions, nine percent reported 
that they would not want to participate in a decision about taking an 
investigational medication for dementia.  The participants who chose not to 
participate were those whose disease was at the most advanced stage.  Although 
most participants (91%) reported that they wanted to participate in the decisions, 
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fewer (70%) paired caregivers predicted that the person with dementia would 
want to participate (Hirschman, Joyce, James, Xie, & Karlawish, 2005).  
This body of research casts doubt on the assumption that routinely 
substituting surrogates for patients deemed to lack capacity is a policy that would 
produce beneficent results.  Even medical associations have recognized that 
participation is beneficial to patients.  Citing Hirschman’s study, the American 
College of Physicians, along with 10 other medical associations, endorsed ethical 
guidelines that encourage providers to make clinical encounters “patient-
centered, allowing for maximum appropriate patient autonomy and participation 
in decision-making” and to support “patients’ ongoing participation in decisions 
about their care” (Mitnick, Leffler, & Hood, 2010, p. 256).  
 
Supported Decision-Making:  An Alternative to  
Surrogate Decision-Making 
The legal standards approach to decision-making capacity assumes that 
beneficence can be pursued only at the expense of autonomy, and that the two 
principles are mutually exclusive.  That has traditionally been true in contentious 
legal battles, but it is not necessary in healthcare delivery.  While some patients 
with impaired decisional abilities may assert the right to make irrational 
decisions, decisions based on untrue premises, or other “bad” decisions that 
challenge providers, ethics committees, and sometimes even legal departments, a 
small study of 37 older adults representing a rage of cognitive function (mean 
MoCA score of 19) suggests that the overwhelming majority of patients, including 
those who would likely be judged as lacking capacity, want to work with their 
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physicians and want input from their families or friends in making medical 
decisions.  
It is difficult to come up with a reason why practice would not support 
these patients’ desire to be involved in their healthcare, while providing 
appropriate support in the decision-making process to address cognitive or other 
deficits.  To do so would be akin to denying a person who cannot walk crutches, 
instead insisting that others must push her around in a wheelchair, because she is 
unable to walk without crutches.    
For this reason, the dichotomous view of capacity is being replaced with 
advocacy for supported decision-making.  That was the case in Ross v. Hatch, Va. 
Cir. Ct. 2013.  Article 12 of the United Nations Charter on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities implicitly adopts supported decision-making when it requires 
parties to “recognize [that] persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an 
equal basis with others in all aspects of life” and “take appropriate measures to 
provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in 
exercising their legal capacity.”  Taking a smaller step, but still recognizing the 
value of inclusion, the Utah Advance Care Planning Act requires surrogates to 
make decisions “in accordance with the adult’s current preferences, to the extent 
possible”  (Utah Code S §75-2A-110), recognizing that even a person who lacks 
the legal ability to make healthcare decisions independently has the right to have 
preferences honored. These legal shifts signal increasing awareness that 
autonomy and inclusion are important, even for individuals with impaired 
decisional abilities.   
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Unfortunately, however, there is little guidance on how to encourage 
participation in care decisions because the emphasis in research on decision-
making capacity has continued to focus on dichotomous line-drawing, not on 
how to involve people in decisions about their care.  In 1996, Kapp and Mossman 
wrote, “By focusing clinical efforts and attention on quantitative assessment of a 
putative yes-no attribute, a capacimeter may direct attention away from what 
clinicians can and should do in working with patients whose thinking is 
impaired” (p. 93).  The statement was prescient.  Since that time, almost every 
publication addressing impaired decisional capacity has measured capacity, 
evaluated the reliability of one or more instruments, considered differences 
between instruments, or offered reviews of studies of capacity assessment 
instruments.  Kapp and Mossman recommended that efforts focus on a process of 
“assisted consent,” an approach that empowers individuals with impaired 
decisional capacity by respecting their stated preferences and maximizing 
relevant abilities. They expressed concern, however, that assisted consent was “in 
jeopardy of quickly becoming ignored if there is too enthusiastic a rush to 
quantify and categorize decisional capacity according to standardized test scores” 
(p. 93).   
In nearly 2 decades since those words were published, there has been little 
to no attention focused on how to identify and address reversible impairments, 
how to support quality decision-making for individuals with impaired capacity 
who have been judged to have decisional capacity, or how to involve in decision-
making those individuals who have been judged to lack capacity, but who retain 
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the ability and desire to participate in the decision-making process in some 
manner. 
 
Lessons from Shared Decision-making 
There has been research on s ha r ed  decision-making, which is defined as 
“a collaborative process that allows patients and their providers to make health 
care decisions together, taking into account the best scientific evidence available, 
as well as the patient’s values and preferences” (Informed Medical Decisions 
Foundation, 2014, p. 1).  Shared decision-making has increasingly been 
recognized as an effective decision-making methodology that acknowledges “the 
need to support autonomy by building good relationships, respecting both 
individual competence and interdependence on others” (Elwyn et al., 2012, p. 
1361).  Although shared decision-making has been studied primarily in 
populations of individuals without dementia, it stands in contrast to the legal 
standards paradigm because it recognizes that decision-making is a collaborative, 
not solitary, process.  Shared decision-making is receiving increasing attention in 
geriatrics (Milte et al., 2013) because it improves the chances that patients will 
receive care based on their values and goals (Karel, Moye et al. 2007) especially 
in circumstances where one treatment is not obviously better than an alternative 
(Oshima Lee & Emanuel, 2013).  Shared decision-making can range from the act 
of providing publications and brochures or videos to patients, to one-on-one 
interaction among providers, patients, and their families.   
A system of supported decision-making could use concepts already 
explored in the literature on shared decision-making, but supported decision-
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making would require a more comprehensive array of services and policy 
changes.  Supported decision-making would need to start with an assessment of 
the person’s goals and preferences within the decision-making process.  For 
example, an instrument such as the Control Preference Scale could be used to 
evaluate the person’s desired level of participation in the decision-making 
process in relationship to the provider, but also in relationship to a decision 
companion, who could be a family member, friend, peer counselor, or even a 
professional such as a social worker.  The second step would match the supports 
to the person’s goals, preferences, and needs.  Supports would likely be provided 
by a multidisciplinary team.   
 
Supported Decision Research Agenda 
Although the policy shifts described earlier in this article call for an 
increased use of supported decision-making, there will need to be research to 
develop effective, evidence based strategies for supported decision-making.   
The first recommendation is that NIH and other federal agencies shift 
funding away from tools and measurements of capacity designed to produce a 
dichotomous capacity judgment, and instead fund studies that define the 
elements of supported decision-making, test approaches to supported decision-
making, and define quality in supported decision-making.  Of particular concern 
will be the development of quality assurance procedures to prevent supported 
decision-making from becoming manipulative or coercive.  It will also be 
important to understand how supported decision-making interventions affect 
both objective outcomes, such as mortality, medication use, and biological 
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markers, as well as patient reported measures, such as measures of patient 
wellbeing.  
Another important change in the research agenda would address the 
exclusion of individuals with impaired cognitive function from research studies.  
Just as the exclusion of women of child-bearing age from drug trials skewed 
those results, the exclusion of a substantial percentage of older adults (those with 
Mini Mental State Examination or Montreal Cognitive Assessment scores below a 
certain cut point, or those with a diagnosis of dementia or cognitive impairment) 
will skew the findings of research studies.  Perhaps instead of justifying to IRBs 
why individuals with cognitive impairment should be allowed to participate in 
studies, researchers should be required to justify their exclusion.  
 
Supported Decision-Making Policy Agenda 
The primary policy change that would encourage supported decision-
making is a shift away from the legal presumption that patients found to lack the 
ability to independently make healthcare decisions should be excluded from 
decisions about their care and replaced by a surrogate decision-maker.  That 
presumption should be replaced with the presumption that a person has the right 
to choose supported decision-making.  Exclusion should be a last resort. Also, 
because exclusion can impact a person’s fundamental right to liberty (for 
example if the decision is to place the person in a locked rehabilitation facility), 
people should receive due process protections when their rights are affected.  
This change will not be easy, because the law governing informed consent and 
surrogate decision-making is almost entirely found in state law, so these changes 
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would have to happen in all 50 states and territories.   
It is possible, however, to influence care delivery through Medicare and 
Medicaid law and policy because they fund the majority of healthcare delivered in 
the U.S. to older adults, as well as younger adults with serious diabilities.  
Conditions of participation for those programs could require providers to offer 
supported decision-making to patients found to lack the ability to make informed 
healthcare decisions without assistance.  Those programs could also provide 
funding for supported decision-making.   
 
Implementing Supported Decision-Making 
No law or policy in the U.S. today prevents providers from engaging 
patients in treatment decision-making, even if the provider has found that a 
patient’s decisional abilities are impaired to the degree that they lack the ability 
to give informed consent for treatment without support.  A provider faced with 
such a patient should always start by considering whether the reason for 
impaired ability is treatable or reversible.  In some instances, a patient can 
demonstrate capacity if a physician or nurse or social worker slows down the 
process of providing the information, carefully breaks the decision-making 
process into smaller steps, or uses decision-aids (Sugarman, McCrory, & Hubal, 
1998).  If those steps are unsuccessful, the provider can ask the patient about his 
or her preferred role in the decision-making process.  If the patient agrees to 
involve a companion to assist in the decision-making process, then the consent 
process can proceed within the triad.  Providers obtaining a signature on an 
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informed consent form can ask both the patient and the companion to sign the 
form.   
If a patient declines to receive support and the physician does not think 
treatment can proceed without someone other than the patient providing 
consent, then other structures, such as social workers who can help to negotiate 
relatioships, ethics committees, and, as a last resort, legal departments, can be 
called on to determine next steps.  Supported decision-making will not eliminate 
the need for an adjudication of capacity in some particularly difficult cases, but 
those cases should be rare exceptions, not the rule.   
Kapp and Mossman remarked that a “subtle and nuanced approach to 
thinking about making medical decisions” is “a concept that the legal system is 
poorly equipped to accommodate” (1996, p. 93).  The healthcare system, in 
contrast to the legal system, has substantial flexibility to address the subtle and 
nuanced issues raised when addressing challenges raised when an individual has 
impaired decisional abilities, and the vast majority of capacity adjudications are 
made by physicians and other providers, not by the legal system.  The legal 
standards approach to capacity assessment imposes the rigidity of the legal 
system on the healthcare system, likely to the detriment of the individuals with 
impaired decisional abilities.  
 
Conclusion 
As the healthcare delivery system enters an era where more older adults 
with impaired decisional abilities are receiving healthcare, and as their rights to 
remain involved in decisions about their care are increasingly acknowledged, 
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new, effective strategies will be needed.  Evidence hints that such a system could 
improve the wellbeing of people.  At a minimum, it would start with collaboration 








Figure 4.1.   Dichotomous Legal Standards Paradigm 
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USE OF A MODIFIED CONTROL PREFERENCE SCALE 
AMONG OLDER ADULTS ACROSS A RANGE  
OF COGNITIVE FUNCTION 
 
Introduction 
The current approach to decision-making capacity neither requires nor 
encourages clinicians to involve patients in decisions about their care after being 
judged by the provider to lack the legal capacity to make medical decisions.  
Providers have been advised to make dichotomous capacity judgments about a 
patient’s ability to make treatment decisions, and, if they judged that a patient 
lacked capacity, they were directed to seek a surrogate to make decisions on 
behalf of the patient (Appelbaum, 2007; Reuben et al., 2014; Sessums, 
Zembrzuska, & Jackson, 2011). 
Increasingly, however, state and federal laws, and even an international 
convention, mandate or encourage providers to include patients with impaired 
decisional abilities in decisions about their care.  The Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) requires full integration of individuals with disabilities (Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 1990).  The Utah Advance Care Planning Act requires 
surrogate decision-makers to make decisions “in accordance with the adult’s 
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current preferences, to the extent possible”  (Utah Code §75-2A-110), recognizing 
that individuals who lack the legal ability to make healthcare decisions 
independently may still choose to be involved in decisions. Article 12 of the 
United Nations Charter on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which is 
modeled in part on the ADA, requires providers to “recognize [that] persons with 
disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life” 
(¶ 2) and “take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with 
disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity” (¶ 
3).   Consistent with these mandates, a Virginia court recently refused to exclude 
an adult with Down Syndrome from participating in her own care decisions, even 
though she lacked the ability to make those decisions without support in Ross v. 
Hatch, Va. Cir. Ct. 2013. 
Despite this changing policy landscape, there is a dearth of research on 
how to meaningfully and effectively engage patients in decisions about their care. 
Past research on decisional capacity has largely focused on the question of how to 
identify those patients who are able to independently make medical decisions 
(Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; Berg et al., 1996; Marson & Moye, 2007; Moye & 
Marson, 2007).  This approach to capacity assessment rests on the view that 
individuals who fail to meet certain standards are nonautonomous (Berg et al., 
1996), and that replacing the person with a surrogate decision-maker avoids the 
risk of a bad decision by an impaired patient (Appelbaum, 2007).  
There is evidence, however, that patients with impaired decisional abilities 
want to be involved in decisions about their care.  For example, 92% of patients 
with Alzheimer’s disease expressed the desire to be involved in making a decision 
93 
 
about participation in a study of an investigational medication for Alzheimer’s 
disease (Hirschman, Joyce, James, Xie, Casarett, et al., 2005; Hirschman, Joyce, 
James, Xie, & Karlawish, 2005).   
In a series of studies, a group of researchers examined patient preferences 
for involvement in decisions about everyday living among older adults with 
cognitive impairment (Clark, Tucke, & Whitlatch, 2008; Feinberg & Whitlatch, 
2001, 2002; Judge, Menne, & Whitlatch, 2010; Menne, Johnson, & Whitlatch, 
2008; Menne et al., 2009; Menne, Tucke, Whitlatch, & Feinberg, 2008; Menne & 
Whitlatch, 2007; Whitlatch, Feinberg, & Tucke, 2005a, 2005b).  Across the 
studies, older adults with impaired decisional abilities were able to report 
preferences for involvement in daily care decisions, and involvement in decisions 
is a predictor of quality of life, based on the Quality of Life-Alzheimer’s Disease 
(“QOL-AD”) scale, which provides a score representing patients’ perspectives on 
their views on friends, energy, mood, marriage, and ability to do things for fun 
(Logsdon, Gibbons, McCurry, & Teri, 1999).  Combined with the study by 
Hirschman and colleagues cited above, this body of research suggests the 
importance of involving older adults with impaired decisional abilities in 
decisions that affect their lives.   
The purpose of this study was to build on prior research by piloting a 
modified Control Preference Scale (MCPS) to elicit control preferences of older 
adults with impaired decisional abilities who might be deemed incapable of 





Employing a mixed methods design, this study used a modified Control 
Preference Scale (MCPS) (Degner et al., 1997; Nolan et al., 2005), and 
semistructured interviews guided by cognitive interviewing techniques to elicit 
participants’ preferences.  Thirty-seven residents of two assisted living facilities 
and three nursing homes were interviewed one time.  Quantitative and 
qualitative analyses were conducted to evaluate the use of the MCPS in the 
population.  A university IRB approved the study. 
 
Settings and Participants 
 
Individuals were considered for participation if, according to their health 
record and/or the judgment of facility personnel and/or the investigator, they 
were age 65 or older and English-speaking, had sensory, physical, and cognitive 
function sufficient to participate in the interview, and were currently free from 
active mental illness or chemical dependency.   
Consent was obtained by the investigator, an elder law attorney with 
training and experience in medical ethics, consenting participants for research 
studies, and evaluating the capacity of adults with cognitive impairment 
according to a range of legal standards.  In addition to reading the IRB-approved 
consent form to participants, the investigator asked participants to explain, in 
their own words, the risks and benefits of participation and what study 
participation would require of them.  The investigator considered whether 
potential participants had the requisite ability to communicate, and to rationally 
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evaluate, understand, and appreciate the nature of the study, their role in the 
study, and the risks and benefits of participating in the study (Grisso et al., 1995).  
For example, a potential participant who was approached was not enrolled when 
she expressed the desire to help, but was unable to demonstrate an 
understanding of how her participation would contribute to the study, even after 
different explanations were provided.  Throughout the consent process and 
interviews, participants were offered the opportunity to stop the interview if signs 
of physical or emotional distress were observed.   
Interviews were conducted in quiet locations selected by the participant, 
such as conference rooms or the participant’s room.  In some instances, 
interviews were conducted in quiet public areas, such as the dining room between 
meal times, or other areas selected by the participant.   
 
Measures 
Descriptive information included age, sex, race/ethnicity, marital status, 
education, and residential setting, and the relationship with a decision 
companion.  To identify the decision companion, participants were asked to 
identify a person who would help them to make future medical decisions.   
 
Modified Control Preference Scale (MCPS) 
The original version of the CPS (Degner et al., 1997) was used to evaluate 
participants’ preferred role in past and future treatment decision-making 
encounters.  The CPS is a simple and easy-to-administer scale that has been 
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found to be a valid, reliable, and clinically relevant measure of individuals’ 
preferred treatment decision-making role (Degner et al., 1997).   
Both the original and modified versions of the CPS have been widely used 
in a different patient populations with a variety of conditions, including older 
adults (Ekdahl, Andersson, Wiréhn, & Friedrichsen, 2011).  The original, single-
item CPS used a card sort method, but later studies have used a “pick one” 
approach (O’ Donnell, Monz, & Hunskaar, 2007).  While the original CPS was 
used to describe the patient’s desired level of control in relationship to a provider 
in future decisions, later versions modified it to a multi-item measure to allow 
comparisons of patient preferences for future decision-making to the level of 
control exercised in past decisions (Singh et al., 2010), and comparisons of the 
desired level of control by a companion, typically a family member, to the desired 
level of control by a provider (Nolan et al., 2005).  
In this study, both of these modifications were used to elicit participants’ 
preferences about (1A) the role of provider in a past encounter; (1B) the role of a 
companion in a past encounter; (2A) the preferred role for provider in a future 
encounter; and (2B) the preferred role for the companion in a future encounter.  
For example question 2A directed the participant, “Think about a [health care 
provider’s name/type] visit where a decision is made in exactly the way you 
want.”  The participant was then shown an illustration of the following five 
options (shown in Figure 3.2): 
1. I prefer to make the decisions about which tests or treatments I receive. 
2. I make the decisions about which tests or treatments I receive after 
seriously considering [health care provider’s name/type] opinion. 
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3. I prefer that [health care provider name/type] and I share 
responsibility for deciding which tests or treatments I receive. 
4. I prefer that [health care provider’s name/type] make the final 
decisions about which tests or treatments I receive after seriously 
considering my opinion. 
5. I prefer to leave all decisions about which tests or treatments I receive 
to [health care provider’s name/type]. 
The final two items, developed by Nolan et al. (2005), asked the participant to 
compare the input from the provider and companion: 
(3A) When making decisions about your treatment r ig h t  n o w , how do 
you weigh the input of your doctor and the input of 
[COMPANION]?”  
(3B) If you were u n co n s cio u s  a n d  s er io u s ly  i ll, how would you 
weigh the input of your doctor and the input of [COMPANION]?”   
Participants were asked to choose from the following three responses to 
questions 3A and 3B:  
1. My doctor’s input weighs most heavily. 
2. My doctor’s input and [companion’s name]’s input are about equally 
important. 
3.  [Companion’s name]’s input weighs most heavily. 
The complete MCPS is shown in Table 5.1. 
The study performed by Nolan et al. (2005) was used as a comparison to 
the results of this study.  The Nolan study was designed to evaluate the decision-
making preferences of patients recently diagnosed as suffering from a life-
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threatening illness, including cancer, ALS, or congestive heart failure.  The mean 
age of participants was 62.0 (SD = 12.5).  The study protocol excluded 
participants with an adjusted error score of   5 on the Short Portable Mental 
Status Questionnaire (SPMQ) (Sulmasy, 2014).  Five or more errors on the 
SPMSQ suggests moderate to severe intellectual impairment, with 3-4 errors 
suggesting mild intellectual impairment.  To adjust the SPMSQ score, one point 
was subtracted from error score if the subject had only a grade school education, 
and one point added to the error score if the subject had more than a high school 
education (Pfeiffer, 1975).  
 
Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) 
To estimate participants’ cognitive status at the time of the interview 
without biasing the interviewer, the MoCA (Nasreddine et al., 2005) was 
administered after the interview was concluded.  Prior testing of the MoCA 
provided evidence of test-retest reliability (r=.92, p  <.001) (Nasreddine et al., 
2005), and internal consistency with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.83.  For 
participants in this study with visual or fine motor impairments that prevented 
full administration of the MoCA, only a subset of the items were completed; a 
scaled score was used to estimate the total score.  The percentage of correct 
responses to completed items was calculated, and then that percentage of points 
available for unanswered items was calculated and added to the number of 
correct responses, yielding an estimate of cognitive status.  Nasreddine 
recommends the following interpretation of MoCA scores, but notes that severity 
ranges have not yet been established: > 26 = normal range, 18-26 = mild 
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cognitive impairment; 10-17 = moderate cognitive impairment, and < 10 = severe 
cognitive impairment (Nasreddine, 2014). 
 
Procedures and Analysis  
Data Organization 
Questionnaire responses were manually entered into SPSS version 22. To 
permit comparisons between preferences of participants in this study and 
preferences reported in the study by Nolan et al. (2005) (with permission from 
the corresponding author), those results were also entered into SPSS.  For the 
interview data, one researcher organized the text by combining all statements 
related to decision-making with the provider and decision companion, 
respectively.   
 SPSS v. 22 was used to conduct statistical analysis.  NVIVO 9 was used to 
manage and analyze the qualitative data.  
 
Quantitative Procedures and Analysis 
Convergent Validity:  Comparison with Nolan Results 
The analysis tested the hypothesis that control preferences and weight 
given to input from providers and companions among participants in this study 
would be aligned with results reported in the study by Nolan et al. (2005), which 
screened out individuals with moderate or severe cognitive impairment.  
Although the sample size limited the conclusions that could be drawn from 
statistical analysis, an analysis that revealed wholly dissimilar results would 
suggest that the use of the MCPS in a population of older adults with impaired 
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decisional abilities would lack convergent validity.   While not conclusive, aligned 
responses would provide preliminary evidence of correlation and convergent 
validity. 
For those MCPS items asked of participants in this study and the study by 
Nolan et al. (2005) (2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B), MCPS preferences of participants were 
compared.   Demographic characteristics for participants in both studies were 
reported to enable a comparison of the study populations.  The mean age of 
participants in the two studies was reported and the significance of the age 
difference between the two populations was evaluated using an independent 
samples t-test.  Response distributions for the respective study populations were 
graphed to allow a visual assessment of alignment between response patterns. To 
test the hypothesis that the response patterns would be aligned, Fisher’s Exact 
tests were conducted to identify significant differences between the study 
populations.  
 
Convergent Validity:  Within Subject Correlation 
A second approach assessing convergent validity considered within subject 
responses to related items. MCPS question 3A is a measure of the r e la t iv e  
w e ig h t  a participant would give to input from a provider and companion in 
future decisions.  MCPS questions 2A and 2B, combined represent the r e la t iv e  
co n t r o l  the participant desires from the provider and companion in future 
decisions.  On their face, relative weight and relative control are closely related, 
but not identical, constructs.  A relative control score (RCS) was created to allow 
a comparison of the combined result of MCPS 2A and 2B with MCPS 3A. 
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MCPS question 3A asked participants how they would weigh the input of 
the provider and companion in a future decision.  Response options were 
assigned a numeric value:  
1 = Provider input > Companion input 
2 = Provider input = Companion input 
3 = Provider input < Companion input 
Responses to MCPS items designed elicit participants’ control preferences for 
future decisions (2A and 2B) were assigned values 1 to 5, with 5 representing the 
highest level of control for the provider or companion within the dyad and 1 
representing the highest level of control for the participant.  A relative control 
score was calculated by comparing provider level of control to the companion 
level of control selected by the participant. The three relative control scores were: 
1. Provider control > Companion control 
2. Provider control = Companion control 
3. Provider control < Companion control 
To illustrate, if a participant preferred his provider to make treatment decisions 
on his behalf (2A Provider = 5) but did not want his son to participate in 
decisions at all (2B Com panion = 1).  The relative control score was 1 because five 
is greater than 1.    
It was hypothesized that a participant’s relative control score would be 
aligned with the response to MCPS 3A because the two represent a closely related 
construct.  To test the hypothesis that the RCS and MCPS3 would be aligned, a 




Reliability:  Internal Consistency of 4-Item  
Control Preference Scale 
Internal consistency of the four MCPS items (1A, 1B, 2A, 2B) that reflect 
the construct Control Preference in this population was evaluated using a 
Cronbach’s Alpha.  An alpha of .80 was considered evidence of internal 
consistency (Pett, Lackey, & Sullivan, 2003).  Although the sample size was too 
small to conclusively establish reliability, low internal consistency would suggest 
unreliable responses.  
 
Qualitative Analysis 
Triangulation:  Narrative Responses 
Triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data was used for three 
purposes:  to assess content validity by evaluating participants’ explanations of 
their MCPS responses (Tavernier, Totten, & Beck, 2011), to obtain a more 
complete understanding of participants’ decision preferences, and to evaluate 
whether participants thought the MCPS effectively captured their preferences.  
Semistructured interview questions based on cognitive interviewing techniques 
(Willis, 2005) were used to elicit narrative responses from participants about 
their decision-making preferences and understanding of the MCPS.  For example, 
participants were asked to describe their preferences for control in their own 
words.  
A coding template based on the MCPS interview questions was created.  
The portion of the template relevant to this portion of the analysis is shown in 
Table 5.2.  The coding template was systematically applied to the transcripts, and 
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open coding was conducted to capture any data that may have been missed in the 
initial template development. Low inference codes were used to describe 
participants’ views of their role in the treatment decision-making process.  To 
establish credibility of the coding, two researchers independently coded the data, 
then discussed coding results to reconcile differences.  
One of the researchers then compared the text coded with template codes 
(e.g., “describes decision preferences, provider/future”) and compared the MCPS 
responses to the narrative descriptions offered by participants to identify any 
instances where the MCPS response was inconsistent with the narrative. 
Exemplar quotes were selected to illustrate the codes, and the second researcher 




A total of 62 individuals were approached. Nineteen declined to 
participate for a 31% refusal rate (Figure 5.2); reasons for refusal were neither 
sought nor offered.  Among those who began the consent process, three were 
judged by the researcher to lack sufficient understanding of the study to provide 
informed consent to participate and two individuals with physical illness (both 
referred by their physicians) who were thought to have little or no cognitive 
impairment were unable to stay awake through the consent process.  Thirty-eight 
participants were enrolled in the study, but one withdrew before completing the 
demographic questionnaire due to a scheduling conflict.  Of those who completed 
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the study, 25 participants were recruited from two assisted living facilities, and 12 
were recruited from three nursing homes. 
The demographic characteristics of participants are provided in Table 5.3.  
Half of the participants were over age 82, and 68% were female. Eight percent 
were members of ethnic or minority groups.  While the majority completed high 
school, 11% had less than a high school education, and 33% were college 
graduates.  Forty-nine percent were widowed, 24% divorced, and the remainder 
were divided evenly between single and married (13% each).   
Three participants declined to begin the MoCA due to pain or fatigue 
(n=2) or lack of time (n=1).  Thirty-eight percent of participants who began the 
MoCA (13/34) were unable to complete all items due to visual or physical 
disabilities; their scores were scaled. Participants represented a range of cognitive 
function: of the 30 possible points on the MoCA, 9% of participants (3/34) had 
scores at or above 26, suggesting no impairment, 56% of participants (19/34) 
scored between 18 and 25, suggesting mild cognitive impairment, and the 
remaining 35% (12/34) scored at or below 17, suggesting moderate to severe 
cognitive impairment.  Results of MoCA scores are reported in Table 5.4. 
 
Validity of MCPS 
Convergent Validity:  Comparison with Nolan Study Results 
Participants’ responses to the MCPS were compared to the responses of 
participants in the Nolan et al. (2005) study. Reported demographic 
characteristics of participants in the Nolan study are included in Table 5.3.  The 
mean age of participants in this study was 20 years older than the mean age of 
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Nolan study participants.  An independent samples t-test showed that the age 
difference between the two samples was significant (t=8.9480, df = 165, p  < 
.0001).  
Despite differences between the study populations, including age and 
cognitive function, the distribution of responses to MCPS items 2A, 2B, and 3A 
were aligned, as shown in Figures 5.3 through 5.5; a Fisher’s Exact test did not 
detect significant differences between the preferences of the two study 
populations for these three items.  For MCPS item 3B, the Fisher’s Exact test 
found a significant difference between the preferences of the participants in the 
two studies, with a higher percentage of participants in this study valuing the 
input from the provider and companion equally, and a lower percentage of 
participants in this study putting more weight on the input from a companion.  
 
Convergent Validity:  Within Subject Correlation  
Twenty-eight participants answered the three questions used to evaluate 
inter-item consistency by comparing the RCS to MCPS 3A; results are shown in 
Table 5.5. Seventy-one percent (20/28) of the paired RCS and MCPS 3A numbers 
were matched.  A Spearman's rank-order correlation was calculated to assess the 
relationship between RCS and MCPS 3A.  Although there was a relationship was 




Quantitative Evidence of Reliability 
Internal Consistency (Cronbach’s Alpha) 
To determine if four MCPS items (1A, 1B, 2A, 2B) represented the 
construct Co n t r o l Pr efer en ce  in the study population, Cronbach’s Alpha was 
used. The scale had an acceptable level of internal consistency in the study 
population, as determined by a Cronbach's alpha of 0.764.  This result suggests 
that the four MCPS items were measuring the same, or a closely related, 
construct. 
 
Qualitative Evidence:  Triangulation 
Logical Consistency Reliability 
As reported above, 20 of 28 participants responded to the two MCPS items 
that made up the Relative Control Score (preferred level of control desired from 
provider and companion, respectively) in a pattern that was identical to the 
pattern they chose for MCPS 3A (weight of input from provider and companion, 
respectively).  Two of 28 participants responded in a manner that suggested a 
violation of the rules of deductive logic (e.g., more control desired from provider, 
but greater weight given to companion), with the remaining six responding in a 
manner that neither supported nor undermined the reliability of their responses. 
 
Cognitive Interviewing Findings 
Most participants offered a narrative explanation of preferences, in 
addition to their responses to the MCPS.  Text generally supported, explained, or 
clarified participants’ choice of MCPS options.  
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Provider/Participant Roles in Future Decisions 
Participants who selected assertive options on the MCPS questions 
concerning the role of the providers provided explanations supporting their 
choices.  For example one said, “He knows more than I know about it. So I want 
his intake, but I still make up my own mind.”  Another explained, “I would 
discuss it with him but the final decision would be mine, as I said, as long as I’m 
compos mentis.”  A third said, “I always make my own decisions. Nobody decides 
for me.” 
Those participants who wanted to share decision-making described that 
preference.  For example, one explained: 
We ought to make the decision together, I think.  The doctor and me ought 
to make the same decision out of the same problem, instead of just being 
on one side. We ought to both make the decision for what we need to do. 
Just one of us shouldn’t be right. We ought to look at the examples, look at 
the final decision, then make the final decision together. 
Another said, “I believe [the option representing a shared decision-making] 
would have to be it. I mean, if you didn’t both believe in it, why are you there?”  A 
participant who selected a passive role with respect to her provider explained, 
“The doctor makes the decisions.  He tells me what was right.” 
 
Companion/Participant Roles in Future Decisions 
Participants offered explanations for their preference for a more active 
role in decision-making when compared to the roles they wanted for decision 
companions.  One participant explained that she wanted her daughter to have a 
limited role in decisions, “Sometimes I don’t like [my daughter’s] way of….  The 
way I want I things done and the way she wants things done are two different 
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things.”  Another affirmed her relationship with her daughters, but still wanted 
their role in decision-making to be limited: “They… we talk on the phone, you 
know. But I don’t depend on them to make the decision…. My daughters don’t 
have much say.”  Other explanations were categorical:  “Q:  Now  think about 
your son... A: The only person who makes the final decision is my doctor.”  One 
participant denied that her companion had any role in decision-making:  “No, I 
don’t think my daughter has anything to do with making my decisions.”  In 
response to a follow-up question, “Ideally , do you w ant your daughter involved 
in m aking decisions, w hile you’re still able to m ake your ow n decisions?” she 
replied, “Not especially. She and I have different points of view, which I’m 
coming to realize slowly.”   
Participants also explained preferences for sharing responsibility for 
decisions with a decision companion, usually one or more children.  In response 
to the question, “You and your daughter share responsibility?” one participant 
replied, “We usually do.  I value her.”  Another explained that her children 
participate in decision-making, “Because they’ve got brains, I mean, and 
education, and a lot of things.”   
There was very little text related to the choice of a passive role in decision-
making.  In explaining the role of her daughter, one participant said, “My 
daughter makes them [health care decisions], and I agree with them.”  One 
participant who selected a passive role, but had made earlier statements 
suggesting she wanted an active role in decision-making, explained: 
A.  I think I would let them make the decision. 
Q.  Is that w hat you w ant? Or is that w hat happened in the past. 
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A.  Well I’m old... if it happened it happened.  I didn’t want to leave any 
bad feelings with them when I go.  [Pause] 
Q.  So it’s better to go along w ith it than to... 
A.  Fight it.  They might know better than I know. 
 
Evidence of Unreliable MCPS Responses 
Researchers found no evidence that MCPS responses were unreliable.  The 
coding template included the code, “Stated preferences are inconsistent with 
MCPS responses” but no text was appropriate for this code; when participants 
explained their responses, their explanations were congruent with their selection 
of MCPS options. 
 
Rejecting MCPS Choices 
Some participants did not find an MCPS option that reflected their 
experiences.  For example, one participant rejected the shared decision-making 
option, then, when offered, “I prefer that my doctor make the final decisions 
about which tests or treatments I receive after seriously considering my opinion,” 
replied: 
It doesn’t quite describe it because I will tell the doctor what conditions I 
feel, and the doctor approves of or he knows what they are.  He checks me 
enough to know what they are.  And then we just both agree on what 
should be done.  He agrees on what should be done.  Or he says what 
should be done, and then I agree on it.   
Another participant did not perceive distinctions between MCPS choices offered: 
Q:   [After reading MCPS 2A, then pause]  Generally speaking, would 
you prefer that you and the doctor share responsibility for which tests or 
treatments you receive? 
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A:   Yes.  
Q:   Or would you want to make the final decision after seriously 
considering the doctor’s opinion?  
A:   Well I sort of wind up making the final decision anyway.  
Q:   Do you see a difference between those two options?  
A:   Not really. 
 
Discussion 
This study was designed to evaluate the validity and reliability of the 
MCPS to elicit preferences for decision control among individuals across a range 
of cognitive function.  This study provides preliminary support for the use of the 
MCPS to capture decision-making preference of older adults, even those with 
impaired cognitive function. 
The distribution of preferences across four MCPS items was highly aligned 
with the preferences of a younger and less impaired study population of patients 
facing terminal illness (Nolan et al., 2005), which is evidence of convergent 
validity.  A direct comparison of cognitive status between the study populations 
was impossible because the SPMSQ used by Nolan et al. (2005) could not be 
compared directly to the MoCA results in this study, and the SPMSQ results were 
not reported.  Both studies, however, used instruments that have been shown to 
be valid and reliable instruments for distinguishing among individuals with no 
cognitive impairment or cognitive impairment, versus individuals with scores 
suggesting moderate to severe impairment. It is likely that participants in the 
Nolan study had lower prevalence rates of even mild dementia, because 
prevalence rates are much lower among adults at or below the mean age of that 
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study’s participants than they are in a group of older adults with much higher 
mean age ("2012 Alzheimer’s disease facts and figures," 2012).   
The reliability of participants’ responses was suggested by the finding that 
71% percent (20/28) of participants selected responses across three MCPS items 
that represented logically consistent choices, although the correlation was not 
significant. The Cronbach’s alpha evaluating reliability within a four-item MCPS 
representing control preference demonstrated internal consistency.   Only two of 
28 participants responded to the three questions in a manner that was illogical. 
Finally, participants’ narrative explanations of their preferences, offered in 
response to cognitive interviewing questions, affirmed the relationship between 
the preferences they articulated and their selection among MCPS options, 
supporting the reliability and construct validity of the MCPS in the population of 
individuals represented by the study participants.  
Although some participants struggled with the MCPS, most easily selected 
among options and affirmed that the MCPS accurately captured their view of the 
relationships within the decision-making process.  These findings support the use 
of the MCPS in future research studies with this population and in clinical 
settings, especially if it is paired with an open-ended question to elicit aspects of a 
person’s preferences that might not be captured by the instrument. 
Although most participants faced challenges affecting one or more 
cognitive domains, past research suggests that they have the ability to 
consistently articulate their values and preferences (Menne, Tucke, et al., 2008).  
This study, though small, builds on the evidence cited in the introduction that 
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patients across a range of cognitive function can articulate their preferences for 
treatment decision-making.   
 
Study Limitations 
The study’s small sample size was its most substantial limitation.  In 
addition, the study population was not necessarily representative of all older 
adults, since it was not ethnically diverse, it represented only facility-dwelling 
individuals, and it was a highly educated group of people.  The study sample 
could also reflect selection bias, since about one-third of those invited declined to 
participate, and individuals invited were referred by facility employees who could 
have excluded individuals for reasons other than their failure to meet 
inclusion/exclusion criteria.  Another limitation was the need to use a scaled 
MoCA total score due to the high level of sensory and fine motor disability among 
study participants.  Finally, the study population did not represent the full range 
of individuals with cognitive impairment, because participation required 
participants to have the cognitive ability to consent to participation.  It was 
therefore not able to find a floor for the ability to use the MCPS. 
 
Future Studies 
Although participants were not screened for the ability to specifically make 
medical decisions, many would likely need support from a provider or 
companion, particularly if the choice were serious or complicated. Future studies 
should consider how to help individuals and their companions to navigate the 
process of medical decision-making in the practical context of limited available 
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options, limited resources, and complex relationships.  Future studies should also 
evaluate approaches to meaningfully engage individuals with impaired decisional 
abilities in decisions about their care.  Although participants leaned heavily 
toward engaging with providers, providers may lack the skills, training, and time 
to meaningfully engage in a supported decision-making process with individuals 
with impaired decisional abilities.  Intervention studies could examine different 
strategies for meaningful engagement with both the provider and companion. 
 
Conclusion 
This study provides preliminary support for the use of the MCPS in 
eliciting decision-making preferences of older adults across a range of cognitive 
function for both clinical and research use.  To fully honor the preferences of 
older patients across a range of cognitive function, however, more research is 
needed to develop and implement strategies for supported decision-making for 





MCPS Question Series and Response Options 
CPS:  Provider/past decision 
1 2 3 4 5
I made the decision
about which tests or
treatments I
received.
I made the decision





My doctor and I
shared responsibility
for deciding which
tests or treatments I
received.













1 2 3 4 5
I made the decision
about which tests or
treatments I
received.
I made the decision























1 2 3 4 5











I prefer that my



















1 2 3 4 5

















I prefer that [NAME]
make the final
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NQ: Relative weight between provider and companion/participant involved in decision
1 2 3
My doctor’s input weighs most
heavily.
My doctor’s input and [NAME]’s
input are about equally important.
[NAME]’s input weighs most heavily.
NQ: Relative weight between provider and companion/participant unconscious and seriously ill
1 2 3
My doctor’s input weighs most
heavily.
My doctor’s input and [NAME]’s
input are about equally important.




Coding Tem plate and Open Codes 
Template Codes





Provider vs Companion Weight/Current Decision (Individual Participating)
Provider vs Companion Weight/Future Decision (Individual Not Participating)
Adequacy of MCPS
Table 5.3 
Participant demographics (N=37) compared to Nolan Study (N=130) 
Characteristic Participants Nolan Study
Age, years (mean ± SD) 82 ± 9 62 ± 12.5
Female, n (%) 25 (68%) 47 (37%)
Race, n (%)
Hispanic 1 (2.7%) 9 (7.0%)
African American 1 (2.7%) 30 (23.3%)
Other 1 (2.7%) 7 (5.4%)
White 34 (91.9%) 83 (64.3%)
Marital status, n (%)
Married 5 (13.5%) 64 (49.2%)




  High school graduate 10 (27%) 84 (64.6%)
Some college 15 (40.5%) 46 (35.4%)




Scaled MoCA Scores (N=34)    
Scaled Score n(%)
Mean ± SD 19.1± 4.9
Range 7, 29

26 (no impairment detected*) 3 (9%)
1825 (mild cognitive impairment*) 19 (56%)












Com parison of Relative Control Scale and MCPS 3A, W eight of Input 












Companion 8 2 1 11
Provider =
Companion 3 12 0 15
Provider <
Companion 1 1 0 2
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Nolan 11.5 41.8 40.2 4.1 2.5












Physician more Equal Companion more
Nolan 33.8 51.5 14.6




















Fisher’s Exact Test  9.147, p  = .009 
 
Figure 5.5:     Weight Given to Provider vs. Companion when Participant Not 
Involved 
  
Physician more Equal Companion more
Nolan 22.3 39.2 38.5

















Alzheimer’s Association (2012). Alzheimer’s disease facts and figures. 
Alzheim er's & Dem entia, 8(2), 131-168.  
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §12101 et seq., 12101 
Stat. (1990). 
Appelbaum, P. S. (2007). Assessment of patients' competence to consent to 
treatment. New  England Journal of Medicine, 357(18), 1834-1840.  
Appelbaum, P. S., & Grisso, T. (1995). The MacArthur Treatment Competence 
Study: I. Mental illness and competence to consent to treatment. Law  and 
Hum an Behavior, 19(2), 105-126.  
Berg, J. W., Appelbaum, P. S., & Grisso, T. (1996). Constructing competence:  
Formulating standards of legal competence to make medical decisions. 
Rutgers Law  Review , 48 , 345-396.  
Clark, P. A., Tucke, S. S., & Whitlatch, C. J. (2008). Consistency of information 
from persons with dementia: An analysis of differences by question type. 
Dem entia: The International Journal of Social Research and Practice, 
7(3), 341-358.  
Degner, L. F., Sloan, J. A., & Venkatesh, P. (1997). The Control Preferences Scale. 
Canadian Journal of Nursing Research, 29(3), 21-43.  
Ekdahl, A. W., Andersson, L., Wiréhn, A.-B., & Friedrichsen, M. (2011). Are 
elderly people with co-morbidities involved adequately in medical 
decision-making when hospitalised? A cross-sectional survey. BioMed 
Central Geriatrics, 11(1), 46.  
Feinberg, L. F., & Whitlatch, C. J. (2001). Are persons with cognitive impairment 
able to state consistent choices? Gerontologist, 41(3), 374-382.  
Feinberg, L. F., & Whitlatch, C. J. (2002). Decision-making for persons with 
cognitive impairment and their family caregivers. Am erican Journal of 
Alzheim er's Disease & Other Dem entias, 17(4), 237-244.  
Grisso, T., Appelbaum, P. S., Mulvey, E. P., & Fletcher, K. (1995). The MacArthur 
Treatment Competence Study: II. Measures of abilities related to 
competence to consent to treatment. Law  and Hum an Behavior, 19(2), 
127-148.  
Hirschman, K. B., Joyce, C. M., James, B. D., Xie, S. X., Casarett, D. J., & 
Karlawish, J. H. (2005). Would caregivers of Alzheimer disease patients 
involve their relative in a decision to use an AD-slowing medication? 
Am erican Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry , 13(11), 1014-1021.  
122 
 
Hirschman, K. B., Joyce, C. M., James, B. D., Xie, S. X., & Karlawish, J. H. 
(2005). Do Alzheimer's disease patients want to participate in a treatment 
decision, and would their caregivers let them? Gerontologist, 45(3), 381-
388.  
Judge, K. S., Menne, H. L., & Whitlatch, C. J. (2010). Stress process model for 
individuals with dementia. Gerontologist, 50 (3), 294-302.  
Logsdon, R. G., Gibbons, L. E., McCurry, S. M., & Teri, L. (1999). Quality of life in 
Alzheimer's disease: Patient and caregiver reports. Journal of Mental 
Health and Aging, 5(1), 21-32.  
Marson, D. C., & Moye, J. (2007). Empirical studies of capacity in olders adults: 
Finding clarity amidst complexity. The Journals of Gerontology: Series B: 
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 62B(1), P18-P19.  
Menne, H. L., Johnson, J. D., & Whitlatch, C. J. (2008). What is the relationship 
between background characteristics and the dyadic strain experienced by 
individuals with dementia? Alzheim er's Care Today , 9(3), 190-197. 
Menne, H. L., Judge, K. S., & Whitlatch, C. J. (2009). Predictors of quality of life 
for individuals with dementia. Dem entia, 8(4), 543-560.  
Menne, H. L., Tucke, S. S., Whitlatch, C. J., & Feinberg, L. F. (2008). Decision-
Making Involvement Scale for individuals with dementia and family 
caregivers. Am erican Journal of Alzheim er's Disease and Other 
Dem entias, 23(1), 23-29.  
Menne, H. L., & Whitlatch, C. J. (2007). Decision-making involvement of 
individuals with dementia. Gerontologist, 47(6), 810-819.  
Moye, J., & Marson, D. C. (2007). Assessment of decision-making capacity in 
older adults: An emerging area of practice and research. The Journals of 
Gerontology: Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 
62B(1), P3-P11.  
Nasreddine, Z. S. (2014). MoCA FAQs.  Retrieved from 
http://www.mocatest.org/FAQ.asp 
Nasreddine, Z. S., Phillips, N. A., Bedirian, V., Charbonneau, S., Whitehead, V., 
Collin, I., . . . Chertkow, H. (2005). The Montreal Cognitive Assessment, 
MoCA: A brief screening tool for mild cognitive impairment. Journal of 
the Am erican Geriatrics Society , 53(4), 695-699.  
Nolan, M. T., Hughes, M., Narendra, D. P., Sood, J. R., Terry, P. B., Astrow, A. B., 
. . . Sulmasy, D. P. (2005). When patients lack capacity: The roles that 
patients with terminal diagnoses would choose for their physicians and 
123 
 
loved ones in making medical decisions. Journal of Pain and Sym ptom  
Managem ent, 30 (4), 342-353.  
O’ Donnell, M., Monz, B., & Hunskaar, S. (2007). General preferences for 
involvement in treatment decision-making among European women with 
urinary incontinence. Social Science & Medicine, 64(9), 1914-1924.  
Pett, M. A., Lackey, N. R., & Sullivan, J. J. (2003). Making sense of factor 
analysis: The use of factor analysis for instrum ent developm ent in health 
care research: London, England and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Pfeiffer, E. (1975). A short portable mental status questionnaire for the 
assessment of organic brain deficit in elderly patients. Journal of the 
Am erican Geriatrics Society , 23(10), 433-441.  
Reuben, D. B., Herr, K. A., Pacala, J. T., Pollack, B. G., Potter, J. F., & Semla, T. P. 
(2014). Geriatrics at your fingertips (16th ed.). New York, NY: American 
Geriatrics Society. 
Ross v. Hatch, No. CWF120000426-DP, 113 31633 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2013). 
Sessums, L. L., Zembrzuska, H., & Jackson, J. L. (2011). Does this patient have 
medical decision-making capacity? Journal of the Am erican Medical 
Association, 306(4), 420-427.  
Singh, J. A., Sloan, J. A., Atherton, P. J., Smith, T., Hack, T. F., Huschka, M. M., . 
. . Degner, L. F. (2010). Preferred roles in treatment decision-making 
among patients with cancer: A pooled analysis of studies using the Control 
Preferences Scale. Am erican Journal of Managed Care, 16(9), 688-696.  
Sulmasy, D. P. (2014, 9/22/2014). [Email regarding SPMSQ scoring]. 
Tavernier, S. S., Totten, A. M., & Beck, S. L. (2011). Assessing content validity of 
the Patient Generated Index using cognitive interviews. Qualitative Health 
Research, 21(12), 1729-1738.  
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 106 C.F.R. 
(2006). 
Whitlatch, C. J., Feinberg, L. F., & Tucke, S. S. (2005a). Accuracy and consistency 
of responses from persons with cognitive impairment. Dem entia 
(14713012), 4(2), 171-183.  
Whitlatch, C. J., Feinberg, L. F., & Tucke, S. S. (2005b). Measuring the values and 
preferences for everyday care of persons with cognitive impairment and 
their family caregivers. Gerontologist, 45(3), 11p.  
Willis, G. B. (2005). Cognitive interview ing: A tool for im proving questionnaire 







DECISION-MAKING PREFERENCES OF OLDER ADULTS  
ACROSS A RANGE OF COGNITIVE FUNCTION 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this mixed methods study was to describe how older adults 
across a range of cognitive function characterized their role in a past treatment 
decision-making encounter and their preferred role in future treatment decision-
making encounters.  Decision role relationships with both providers and decision 
companions (in most cases family members) were explored.  In addition to 
evaluating the use of the Control Preference Scale, cognitive interviewing was 
used to identify elements of decision-making not captured by the CPS. 
The treatment preferences of older adults with impaired decisional 
abilities are largely unexplored.  Law, ethics, and clinical practice guidelines view 
capacity as a dichotomous state:  Patients have or lack capacity for treatment 
decisions. As typically framed, once an individual is found to lack capacity a 
surrogate decision-maker should be sought to replace the individual as the 
decision-maker (Appelbaum, 2007; Reuben et al., 2014). Little to nothing is said 
in practice guidelines or research studies on capacity assessment about any role 
for the individual who has been found to lack capacity (Appelbaum, 2007; 
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Appelbaum & Grisso, 1988; Appelbaum & Grisso, 1995; Appelbaum & 
Roth, 1982; Berg & Appelbaum, 2001; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 
1998a, 1998b; Grisso et al., 1995; Meisel et al., 1977; Roth et al., 1977).  The 
approach assumes that any harm that might occur if individuals who lack 
capacity were permitted to make treatment decisions outweighs the harm that 
might result from excluding individuals from their own treatment decisions (Berg 
et al., 1996b).  Increasingly, however, state and federal laws, and even an 
international convention, mandate or encourage providers to include individuals 
with impaired decisional abilities in decisions about their care.  (United Nations, 
2006) ("Advance Health Care Planning Act," 2007) ("Americans with Disabilities 
Act," 1990).   
This study was designed to describe the decision-making preferences of 
older adults across a range of cognitive function from the perspective of the 
individual.  The results will inform the design of future studies that will help to 
guide implementation of the policies and laws that increasingly encourage the 
involvement of all individuals in decisions about their lives, to the degree that 
they desire.  
 
Methods 
This descriptive study used a mixed methods approach to evaluate 




Settings and Participants 
The investigator recruited participants from three nursing homes and two 
assisted living facilities.  Individuals were eligible to participate if they were aged 
65 or older.  Facility staff referred individuals who they viewed as having 
adequate cognitive and physical ability to participate in the consent process and 
an interview predicted to last about one hour.  
Interviews were conducted in quiet locations selected by the participant, 
such as conference rooms or the participant’s room.  In some instances, 
interviews were conducted in public areas, such as the dining room between meal 
times, or other area of the participant’s choosing.  Interviews were audiotaped 
with the consent of each participant. 
 
Mixed Methods 
Mixed methods are used to study phenomenon because “different aspects 
of reality lend themselves to different methods of inquiry” (Sandelowski, 2000, p. 
247).  Health care decision-making is a very complex interaction between patient 
and provider, and in the geriatric population, the complexity is frequently 
compounded further by the presence of one or more individuals such as an 
appointed health care agent, family member, or friend (Kapp, 1991).  This 
complicated interaction is most effectively described and clarified by examining 
the interaction from different perspectives using a combination of research 





Demographic data acquired during the interview included age, sex, 
race/ethnicity, marital status, education, and residential setting, as well as the 
relationship with a decision companion, defined as a person the participant 
identified as being involved in past and future decision-making encounters. In 
order to provide a past decision-making encounter that would serve as a point of 
reference, participants were asked to describe a past decision-making process in 
which they had accepted or rejected medical treatment (“target encounter”).  
 
Satisfaction with Decision Scale (SDS) 
Participants evaluated the decision-making process that occurred during 
the target encounter using the Satisfaction with Decision Scale (SDS), a short and 
easy-to-use instrument designed to measure satisfaction with elements of 
decision-making, such as the degree to which the decision-making process 
contained elements of an effective decision-making process (O'Connor, 1995), 
and satisfaction with participation (Holmes-Rovner et al., 1996). Reliability was 
demonstrated with a Cronbach’s alpha of .86 (Holmes-Rovner et al., 1996). The 
SDS has been used extensively, including a recent study involving older adults 
with dementia (Carmody et al., 2014).  
 
Control Preference Scale (CPS) 
The Control Preference Scale (CPS) (Degner et al., 1997) was used to 
evaluate participants’ perception of their role in the target encounter and their 
preferred role in future decision-making encounters.  The first generation of the 
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CPS was a single item, card sort instrument used to evaluate the patient’s 
preference for control within the patient/physician dyad.  It was found to be a 
valid, reliable, and clinically relevant measure of individuals’ preferred decision-
making roles (Degner et al., 1997).   A number of later studies used the CPS to 
describe individuals’ perception of their roles in past decision-making encounters 
(Jasvinder A. Singh et al., 2010).  The scale has been widely used in different 
populations with a variety of conditions, including older adults (Ekdahl et al., 
2011), although the author did not locate any other studies that  used it to 
evaluate the preferences of a population that includes individuals with impaired 
cognitive function.    
Further expanding the CPS, Nolan and colleagues (2005) used the CPS 
framework to explore control preferences within the patient/companion 
(typically a family member) dyad.  They also extended the CPS to investigate how 
the preferences within the patient/physician and patient/companion dyads 
changed when patients were asked how they would weigh the respective input 
between the physician and companion (1) when the patient is involved in the 
decision and (2) when the patient is unconscious and seriously ill, and 
consequently fully unable to participate in the decision-making process. 
Participants were asked first to describe their decision-making role with 
respect to their physician for a past decision and then about the same decision 
with respect to a decisions companion (generally a family member). Participants 
were then asked about their preferred decision role with respect to the physician 
and decision companion (Table 6.1).  




1A Participant’s reported level of control within the participant/p hy s icia n  
dyad in a p a s t  decision-making encounter 
1B Reported level of control within the participant/companion dyad in a p a s t  
decision-making encounter 
Future encounter: 
2A Preferred level of control within the participant/p hy s icia n  dyad in 
fu t u r e  decision-making encounters 
2B Preferred level of control within the participant/co m p a n io n  dyad in 
fu t u r e  decision-making encounters 
Relative weight of input in future encounter: 
3A Weight given to respective input from the physician and companion in a 
future decision-making encounter in v o lv in g  t he  p a r t icip a n t  
3B Weight given to respective input from the physician and companion in a 
future decision-making encounter that occurs at a time when t he  
p a r t icip a n t  is  u n co n s cio u s  a n d  s er io u s ly  i ll a n d  is  fu lly  u n a b le  
t o  p a r t icip a t e . 
For questions 1A to 2B, participants selected one of five options that best 
represented the past or preferred future decision-making role.  For example, the 
choices for MCPS 2A (future/physician) were: 
1. I prefer to make the decisions about which tests or treatments I receive. 
2. I prefer to make the decisions about which tests or treatments I receive 
after seriously considering my doctor’s opinion. 
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3. I prefer that my doctor and I share responsibility for deciding which 
tests or treatments I receive. 
4. I prefer that my doctor make the final decisions about which tests or 
treatments I receive after seriously considering my opinion. 
5. I prefer to leave all decisions about which tests or treatments I receive 
to my doctor. 
For MCPA 1A through 2B, participants were presented with the five choices 
represented by drawings on a single page (Appendix A).  The three options 
offered for questions 3A and 3B were 
1. My doctor’s input weighs most heavily 
2. [Companion’s] input weighs most heavily 
3. My doctor’s input and [Companion’s] input are about equally 
important 
The six-item series with all response options are shown in Table 6.1. 
 
Cognitive Interviewing 
Cognitive interviewing is a qualitative research technique used to evaluate 
survey questionnaires.  Cognitive interviewing techniques are used to “to study 
the manner in which targeted audiences understand, mentally process, and 
respond to [questions] … with a special emphasis on potential breakdowns in this 
process” (Willis, 2005).  Cognitive interviewing techniques were used to consider 
whether the MCPS accurately captured participants’ views of the target decision-
making process.  In addition, the techniques were used to evaluate whether older 
adults across a range of cognitive function have the ability to respond to the 
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questionnaire.  Probing questions that elicited participants’ descriptions of their 
experiences and preferences following survey administration allowed the 
investigator to evaluate whether the survey responses and associated narrative 
explanations for the responses aligned.  Finally, cognitive interviewing was used 




To estimate participants’ cognitive status at the time of the interview, the 
Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) (Nasreddine et al., 2005) was 
administered after the interview was concluded.  The MoCA was used (1) to 
evaluate the range of cognitive status across study participants, and (2) to 
determine differences in preferences among participants with lower or higher 
total or subscale MoCA scores. Test/retest reliability for the MoCA has a 
correlation coefficient of .92, p  < .001, and internal consistency was 
demonstrated with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.83 on standardized items 
(Nasreddine et al., 2005).   
Many studies involving individuals with suspected cognitive impairment 
use the MoCA or a similar cognitive screening instrument as the first study 
procedure to determine whether participants have the capacity to consent to 
participation, but cognitive screening instruments are not appropriate for 
capacity assessment (J. Karlawish et al., 2013; Pachet, Astner, & Brown, 2010).  
In this study, capacity to consent to participation was assessed as part of the 
informed consent process. 
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Some participants were unable to complete some MoCA items due to 
visual or fine motor skill impairments that prevented full administration.  To 
evaluate relationships between cognitive function and responses to the MCPS, 
subscale scores were used, with uncompleted subscales excluded from 
calculations designed to detect correlations.  For analyses requiring the total 
score, a scaled score was calculated to estimate the total score for participants 
who were unable to complete the MoCA.  The scaled score was calculated based 
on the percentage of points awarded from the points available for completed 
items was calculated. That percentage of the points available for unanswered 
questions was then calculated and added to the points received for completed 
items.  
A scaled score is not a perfect method for addressing missing data in the 
MoCA because the MoCA is comprised of subscales designed to detect 
impairment in distinct cognitive domains; use of a scaled score could result in 
under- or over-weighting one of one or more domain. To show the range within 
which a scaled score could over- or under-estimate the participants’ scores, the 
raw score and the highest score possible (all points were awarded for the 
subscales not completed) were calculated and reported. 
Nasreddine recommends the following interpretation of MoCA scores, but 
notes that severity ranges have not yet been established:    26 = normal range, 
18-25 = mild cognitive impairment, 10-17 = moderate cognitive impairment, and 





An on-line questionnaire for use with decision companions was developed 
to mirror the CPS question series asked of the participants.  At the end of the 
interview, participants were asked if they would consent to having their decision 
companions contacted to complete that portion of the study.  It was emphasized 
that the participant could decline to involve the companion. During the first 19 
interviews, eight of the participants did not consent to involving a decision 
companion.  For the first 10 who consented, two emails each were sent to five 
companions with links to the on-line survey.  One began the on-line survey but 
did not complete it.  The other four did not respond.  Two voicemail messages 
each were left for the other five companions.  None replied.  At that point, it was 
decided to terminate that portion of the study. 
 
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey and  
Information Preferences 
Questions concerning the role of nonmedical companions in medical 
appointments from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey:  Usual Source of 
Care Questionnaire (2010) were asked.  Participants were also asked if they 
wanted their physicians to give them prognostic information about a range of 
health outcomes that may be related to a current or future diagnosis.   
 
Data Organization and Processing 
Questionnaire responses were manually entered into SPSS version 22; 
recordings of interviews were used to validate the response recorded on the form 
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and the data entry. The portions of interview tapes that related to the study 
objectives, including decision-making preferences and satisfaction with past 
decisions, were transcribed verbatim. Remarks that were not related to the study 
objectives (for example the history of a participant’s house’s architecture, or a 
daughter’s desire for the participant's new shoes) were not transcribed. This 
approach reduced unnecessary transcription efforts and avoided the 
transcription of potentially sensitive, but unrelated, data. One researcher 
organized the text by combining all statements related to decision involvement 
with the physician and decision companion, respectively.  NVIVO 9 was used to 
manage and analyze the data.   
 
Analysis 
Descriptive statistics (frequencies and percentages for categorical 
variables, means and standard deviations for continuous variables) were 
calculated for all variables, and additional statistical analyses were conducted 
with SPSS v. 22. 
 
Coding Narrative Text  
A coding template based on the interview questions was created. The 
coding template was then systematically applied to the transcripts allowing for 
open coding to capture any data that may have been missed in the initial template 
development. To establish credibility of the coding template, two researchers 
independently coded the data, using low inference codes to describe participants’ 
views of their role in the decision-making process.  The two researchers discussed 
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coding results and emerging categories. Exemplar quotes were selected by one 
researcher to illustrate each code, and then the second researcher affirmed that 
the selected text represented the code.  
 
Modified Control Preference Scale Analysis 
To describe the level of control study participants reported in the p a s t  
encounter, frequencies for participants’ choices on MCPS 1A 
(participant/physician) and 1B (participant/companion) were calculated and 
reported.  To describe the level of control study participants said they want in 
fu t u r e  decision-making encounters, frequencies for participants’ choices on 
MCPS 2A (participant/physician) and 2B (participant/companion) were 
calculated and reported. To describe how participants weighed the relative input 
of a decision companion and physician during two future scenarios, MCPS 3A 
(participant involved) and 3B (participant unable to be involved), frequencies 
were calculated and reported.  The analysis of participants’ explanations of their 
MCPS choices was reported, along with exemplar quotes from the interviews.  In 
addition, narrative data describing how participants weighed the input from 
decision companions and physicians were reported and representative examples 
of participants’ narrative descriptions for the code were reported. 
 
CPS Response Patterns 
The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test was used to evaluate differences between 
a participant’s responses within following MCPS question pairs: 
1. Physician past (1A) compared to preferred (2A) 
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2. Companion past (1B) compared to preferred (2B)  
3. Physician past (1A) compared to Companion past (1B) 
4. Physician preferred (2A) compared to Companion preferred (2B) 
5. Weight of input between Physician and Companion with 
participant involved (3A) compared to weight of input with 
participant unconscious and seriously ill (3B).  
 
Relationships Between MoCA Scores and CPS Responses 
Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation was used to identify correlations 
between MoCA scores (total and subscales) and CPS responses.  It was 
hypothesized that, consistent with one past study (K. B. Hirschman, Joyce, 
James, Xie, & Karlawish, 2005), participants with the lowest MoCA scores would 
adopt the most passive roles in the decision-making process.  
 
Decision-Making Characteristics Not Captured in CPS 
To describe characteristics of the decision-making process that were 
important to older adults across a range of cognitive function but were not 
captured in the CPS, the qualitative analysis described above was conducted.  
Codes were reported and exemplar quotes provided.  
 
Human Subjects Protection 
The study protocol was approved by the University of Utah Institutional 
Review Board.   The study was designed to include older adults with impaired 
cognitive function, a group that is considered to be vulnerable.  Under the 
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protocol, the interviewer reviewed the consent document with a participant, 
engaging the participant in a discussion about the study and about how the 
participant understood the study protocols, benefits, and burdens.  All of the 
participants who were enrolled in the study were judged to have understood the 
nature of the study and the requirements of the study, and all participants 
consented to participation.  Although the approved protocol allowed consent to 
be obtained from a legally authorized representative when the participant was 
viewed as being unable to provide informed consent, the investigator concluded 
that those participants who lacked the ability to understand the study were also 




A total of 62 individuals were approached. Nineteen declined to 
participate for a 31% refusal rate.  Among those who began the consent process, 
three were judged by the researcher to lack sufficient understanding of the nature 
of the study to provide informed consent to participate and two were unable to 
stay awake through the consent process.  Thirty-eight participants were enrolled 
in the study, but one withdrew before completing the demographic questionnaire 
due to an unexpected visitor.  Of those who completed the study, 25 participants 
were recruited from two assisted living facilities, and 12 were recruited from 
three nursing homes. 
The demographic characteristics of participants are provided in Table 6.2.  
Half the participants were over 82, and 68% were female. Eight percent were 
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members of ethnic or minority groups.  Thirty-three percent were college 
graduates, and 11% had less than a high school education.  About half were 
widowed, and 24% were divorced, with the remainder divided evenly between 
single and married.   
The relationships between participants and the decision companions they 
identified are reported in Table 6.3.  A majority of participants (n=27) named one 
or more adult children as a decision companion.  Among five participants who 
named a spouse as the decision companion, all spontaneously named alternate 
decision companions including one or more children (n=4) or a nephew (n=1).  
Other participants named siblings, friends, or facility staff as primary or 
secondary decision companions.  
 
Cognitive Status 
Among the 37 participants, 8% did not start the MoCA (3/37), and 35% 
(13/37) were unable to complete all of the MoCA subscales due to visual or motor 
impairments. Based on a scaled score, participants who started the MoCA 
represented a range of cognitive function: 9% of participants (3/34) scored at or 
above the score where no impairment is detected, 56% of participants (19/34) 
scored in the range suggesting mild cognitive impairment, and the remaining 
35% (12/34) scored in a range suggesting moderate to severe cognitive 
impairment. The study population represents a range of cognitive function, 
whether the scaled score, raw score, or highest possible score were used, as 





Frequencies of SDS responses are reported in Table 6.5.  About two-thirds 
of participants who responded to one or more SDS items responded “agree” to all 
six items.  
 
Control Preference: Physician Past (1A) and Preferred (2A)  
In response to MCPS 2A (preferred role for the physician), about half of 
the participants (18/35) wanted to share decision-making with the physician in 
future treatment decisions, while about a third (12/35) wanted to make the 
decision themselves after seriously considering the physician’s opinions.  Only 
one wanted to make treatment decisions without considering the physician’s 
opinions.  Four participants wanted the physician to make decisions after 
considering the participant’s opinions, and no one wanted the physician to make 
the decision without considering his or her opinion. Results are reported in Table 
6.6. 
Two-thirds of 29 participants who responded to items addressing the 
physician’s role in the past (1A) and preferred role in the future (2A) preferred 
that the physician’s role in future decisions be the same as it was in the past.  For 
the 10 participants who wanted the physician’s roles to be different, nine wanted 
more control in future encounters than they reported having in the past, with 
only one wanting a physician to exercise more control in future encounters than 
in the past.  The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test was conducted to evaluate whether 
participants preferred more control in future encounters than they reported 
having in the past.  The results showed a significant difference in experienced 
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past and preferred future decision preference (z = -2.214, p  = .04).  The mean of 
the ranks in favor of more control by the participant in the future was 8, while the 
mean of ranks in favor of more control by the physician was 5.22. 
Narrative responses supported participants’ MCPS choices.  The following 
examples of text relating to MCPS 2A (participant/physician future) described 
the preference for an active decision-making role.   
(02) He knows more than I know about it. So I want his intake, but I still 
make up my own mind. 
(23) I would discuss it with him but the final decision would be mine, as I 
said, as long as I’m compos mentis.  
(32) I always make my own decisions. Nobody decides for me.  
The following describe a preference for a shared decision-making role: 
 (01) We ought to make the decision together, I think.  The doctor and me 
ought to make the same decision out of the same problem, instead of just 
being on one side. We ought to both make the decision for what we need to 
do. Just one of us shouldn’t be right. We out to look at the examples, look 
at the final decision, then make the final decision together. 
(09) I think the doctor and me together.  I want to know what’s going on. 
It’s my body and I may be wacky, but I don’t think so. 
You and the doctor equally  share in the decision? 
 I believed that would have to be it. I mean, if you didn’t both believe in it, 
why are you there? 
The only participant who preferred to defer decision-making to the physician 
said, “The doctor makes the decisions.  He tells me what was right.” 
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Control Preference: Companion Past (1B) and Preferred (2B)  
Two-thirds of participants (24/36) wanted more control over future 
decisions than their companions, compared to one-fourth (9/36) who wanted to 
share responsibility for with the companion.  Only three participants wanted the 
companion to have most of the control in future decisions.   
Seventeen of the 25 participants responding to MCPS 1B and 2B 
(companion past and future) wanted the companion’s role to be the same in the 
future as it was in the past. For the eight participants who wanted the 
companion’s role to be different, five wanted more control in future encounters 
than they had in the past, and three wanted the companion to have more control 
in future encounters than in the past.   The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test did not 
detect a significant difference between the preference for control in the future 
than the level of control in the past, z = -1.273, p  = 0.203. 
Participants described their preference for an active role in decision-
making when compared with their companions.  
(04) Sometimes I don’t like [my daughter’s] way of ….  The way I want I 
things done and the way she wants things done are two different things. 
(05)  They… we talk on the phone, you know. But I don’t depend on them 
to make the decision…. My daughters don’t have much say. 
(08)  Now  think about your son...  
The only person who makes the final decision is my doctor. 
(16)  W hich w ould you choose for your daughter’s role in a serious 




(25) As long as I’m able I feel that I make the decisions. I haven’t really 
been in a situation where, you know, I’ve needed [family members] 
involved. It’s usually me and the doctor. 
(30)  Ideally , do you w ant your daughter involved in m aking decisions, 
w hile you’re still able to m ake your ow n decisions?  
Not especially. She and I have different points of view, which I’m coming 
to realize slowly.  
Other participants explained the preference for sharing responsibility for 
decisions with a companion.   
(13) You and your daughter share responsibility? 
We usually do.  I value her. 
(22) I want them to [share in decision-making]. Because they’ve got 
brains, I mean, and education, and a lot of things. 
(33) If they want to share it, then I would say that they could be in it.  Yes.  
But don’t think, if they’d say yes or no...  I don’t know.  If they say no, I 
don’t know. 
Or do you think you w ould m ake the decision after seriously  
considering… 
This one says we’d have three votes, yes? 
This one says that you and your children w ould share equally .  This one 
says you w ould m ake the decision after seriously  considering their 
opinions. 
I think we’d share it. 
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In explaining the role of her daughter, a participant who wanted her daughter to 
exercise the most control in decisions said, “My daughter makes them [health 
care decisions], and I agree with them.”  Another responded to the question 
about her children’s role in future decisions: 
(36) I think I would let them make the decision. 
Is that w hat you w ant? Or is that w hat happened in the past. 
Well I’m old... if it happened it happened.  I didn’t want to leave any bad 
feelings with them when I go.  [Pause] 
So it’s better to go along w ith it than to ... 
Fight it.  They might know better than I know. 
 
Control Preference: Physician Compared to Companion  
Past Encounter 
Ten of 20 participants who responded to questions concerning a past 
decision-making encounter involving the physician (1A) and companion (1B) 
selected the same CPS options to describe their preferred role for the physician 
and decision companion.  Nine participants wanted the physician to have more 
control than the companion, in contrast to only one participant who wanted the 
companion to have more control than the physician.  A Wilcoxon test was 
conducted to evaluate differences between involvement levels of the physician 
and companion in past encounters.  The results indicated a significant difference 
that suggested more involvement in the past from the physician than from a 
companion, z = -2.511, p  = 0.012.  The mean of the ranks describing a greater 
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physician role was 5.72, while the mean of the ranks describing a greater 
companion role was 3.5.   
 
Future Decision-Making Encounters 
Half of 34 participants who responded to the two MCPS questions 
concerning the preferred role for the physician (2A) and the companion (2B) in 
future decisions preferred the same level of control for the physician and 
companion.  Fifteen of the 17 participants who wanted different roles for the 
physician and companion in future encounters preferred a more involved role for 
the physician; only two preferred a more involved role for the companion.  A 
Wilcoxon test indicated a significant difference between preferences in favor of 
greater control by the physician than the companion ( z = -3.139, p  = 0.002).  The 
mean of the ranks reflecting a preference for physician involvement was 9.33 
while the mean of the ranks reflecting a preference for companion involvement 
was 6.5.   
 
Weight of Input from Physician and Companion  
in Future Decisions  
When asked to describe how they would weigh the physician’s input 
against the companion’s input in future decisions in v o lv in g  t he  p a r t icip a n t , 
16 of 29 participants weighed the input equally.  Eleven participants weighed the 
physician’s input more than the companion’s, with two weighing the companion’s 
input more than the physician’s, as shown in Table 6.7.  A shift occurred, 
however, when participants were asked to consider a decision being made at a 
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future time when they were fully unable to participate in the decision-making 
process.  Under that scenario, 20 of 29 participants weighed the input equally, 
with five weighing the physician’s input over the companion, and four weighing 
the companion’s input over the physicians.  A Wilcoxon test showed that the shift 
toward the companion and away from the physician was significant, z = -2.828, p  
= .005.  The mean rank representing shifts by eight participants toward greater 
companion input was 4.5, with a mean rank of 0 representing no shifts toward 
greater physician input.  
Consistent with CPS responses, analysis of participant narrative responses 
also showed qualitative differences between how participants viewed the roles of 
physicians and their companions.  The first observation was that physicians were 
viewed as experts. 
(02) W hen you hear “doctor’s opinion” in that question, w hat kinds of 
things should doctor put into form ing his opinions? 
He knows more than I know about it.  So, I want his intake, but I still make 
up my own mind.   
(14) I relied on those guys.  Those guys have had years and years and years 
and years of experience. You ask them a question, you should get a 
reasonable answer. 
(29) I just assume that the doctor knows what the hell he’s talking about. 
In contrast, family members who were not medical professionals were viewed as 
sounding boards or backstops.  One participant with a diagnosis of vascular 
dementia described his son’s role as follows: 
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(20)  So we would have a discussion, but, at the same time, [Son] could 
say, “But Dad, we went through that, and we talked about what would 
happen if they did find something like that.  It’s my understanding that 
you would rather have me make that decision.”  And I said, I would say, 
“Yes, you’re right.”  Because what I’m not sure of today.  I’m not sure if 
somebody hasn’t told me something that would change.  So I could be 
manipulated, as it were.  So this way, I’ve got a safety valve with [Son] 
saying “Dad, this doesn’t make any sense, where you’re going with this.  
And this is why.”  And then we’d go over it again... And right that minute, 
I’d say, “I understand what you’re saying, and yes, I think we should go 
ahead with it then.” 
Another participant described her relationship with her family as follows: 
(27)  I always talk to them.  After I talk to the doctor, I call my kids and I 
talk to them. 
W ould you say  that you and your kids together decide?   
I want their input just in case there’s something that I haven’t thought 
about. 
 
Decision-Making Characteristics not Captured by the MCPS 
Narrative text revealed characteristics about how participants viewed the 





Being Known by the Physician or Companion 
 In addition to relying on physician’s expertise, many participants relied on 
the knowledge that both physicians and companions had about them personally.   
(8)  Are there things the doctor should know  about you w hen form ing 
decisions about your care?  
No. I think he more or less knows.  
…. Do you w ant your doctor to understand your religious view s, or is 
that not an issue for you?  
He does. He may not have the same religion that I do, but he thinks about 
my religion. 
(25)  We’ve been with her [the family physician] so long.  She knows my 
history and ... there’s not anything I don’t think she doesn’t know. 
Other participants emphasized that their companions, usually family members, 
knew them. 
(9) [Daughter]’s pretty smart. Plus she knows me. 
(10) [Step son] knows my religious values. Even though he himself is kind 
of an agnostic, he knows about my conservative Christian values and I 
think he would make decisions for me based on what he knows about me. 
(18) You know, I would consider [wife’s and daughter’s] opinions.  Because 
they know the history of you. 
 
Participant in Control 
None of the participants’ responses suggested that they doubted their 
authority to be the decision-maker, even when they selected a passive role or 
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deferred decision-making to another person.   
 
Past Level of Control not Aligned with Preferred Level of Control 
 Consistent with MCPS responses, participants described misalignment 
between the level of control exercised in past decisions and preferred level of 
control wanted in future decisions for some participants.  Those who experienced 
misalignment typically wanted more control in future encounters than they 
exercised in the target encounter.  
(1)  I feel like I’m kind of out there alone anymore not really making 
decisions on my part alone. Everything I do is not my decision, fully. I 
think everybody else is trying to make the decision one way and I’m trying 
to live another way. So the decision don’t seem to be mine completely. 
(5)  So in som e w ays w hat you think happens is that it’s your doctor and 
your daughter and [staff] w ho are m aking…  
Absolutely.  
…the decisions and that  
Yes. 
…m aybe this needs a picture that represents the doctor and the fam ily , 
and you’re not in the picture at all? 
Um, just so you know how I understand that chart, from my viewpoint. My 
voice should be the voice, with support, is how I feel. 
(9) [Physician] don’t even seem to want to know me now.  I think I’ve seen 
her twice, and she just kind of, it’s her way or the highway. 
That’s not an approach that you w ant? 
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Not from a doctor.  I want them to talk to you and explain things, and say 
we’re going to run these tests, I agree, fine, run the test and see if I do need 
[medications], but don’t take me off of them.   
 
Cognitive Status 
Many participants made statements affirming their cognitive abilities, 
although no questions were asked to elicit that information.   
(3)  [Daughter] thinks I have all this dementia. She doesn’t know that I 
understand, and I can answer your questions and write letters if you need, 
but she thinks that she knows it all. 
(5)  I don’t feel that I’m too mentally handicapped so that I can’t 
participate in my own decisions. 
(9) I’m not gone yet….  I want to know what’s going on. It’s my body and I 
may be wacky, but I don’t think so. 
(10) I’m one of the more high functioning individuals. 
(13) Right now I’m capable of making the decisions and [son] doesn’t have 
to.  
(20) I’m cognitive, I think, as we speak. 
(23) I would discuss it with [Son] but the final decision would be mine, as I 
said, as long as I’m compos mentis.  
(29) I’m not senile. 
(30) As long as I have my mental facilities, I want to make my own 
decisions. 
(31) I hope I have some brains left. 
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Participants did, however, acknowledge cognitive challenges, including some of 
the same participants who remarked on their cognitive abilities.   
(8) I was married to my husband. His last name is [removed]. This is awful 
but I can’t quite remember his first name right now. 
(12) I didn’t remember my last name when I was signing two get well 
cards. Everybody put their names down. I said my name was [first name], 
but I couldn’t remember my last name! When the aide came in and told 
me, I said “That doesn’t sound right.” But I put it on anyhow. 
(20)  I’m not sure if somebody hasn’t told me something that would 
change. So I could be manipulated, as it were. 
(28)  It just seems like lately, lately meaning end of the year. Things have 
just been coming at me. Enough to keep me confused.  
 
End-of-Life Decision-Making 
Although the script and probing questions did not seek to elicit end-of-life 
care preferences, more than half of the participants raised the issue.   
(17)  I’ve got a living will. It says, if I have a problem, just comfort, that’s 
all. 
(23)  My goals. It’s a day-by-day process. I never expected to live to be [age 
deleted], nor did I particularly want to, so I don’t have any goals, per se, 
other than... There’s a difference. I’m not tired of life, but I’m life tired. In 
an environment like this, we jokingly refer to ourselves as inmates, but, 
you know... It’s one of these things where, if the switch were pulled 
tomorrow, or today, I would not be unhappy. 
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(27)  I hope that when I pass on that I do it peacefully, and not be in pain. 
(36)  I just take what comes to me day by day. If I’m going to die, I’m going 
to die. I’ll try to have everything in order so I .... 
 
Congregate Living 
Living in a congregate setting appears to be a challenge to decision-
making.  The single most common source of conflict and disagreement 
articulated by participants involved the decision about where he or she would 
live.  One participant whose MoCA score was in the normal range described the 
decision to move into an assisted living facility.   
(2) When I came here, it was my son’s last word. Not mine. Not the 
doctor’s, even though the doctor suggested it….  And so, my son made all 
the decisions for me to come here. Because the doctor said “NAME you 
cannot stay home.” And I said “ Why?” … And [Son] made the decision. 
When I came in, everything was set up. And I cried for three days.  
She went on to explain one aspect of living in the facility that bothered her. 
I think I’m going to put up a sign: Please don’t sit on my bed. It’s the first 
thing they go to, my bed.  
Another person described an involuntary move into an assisted living facility. 
(5) I didn’t like them moving me down here, in the guise of a visit with my 
granddaughter. I brought four outfits. And I didn’t have any choice. So I 
didn’t like that. I was very angry actually….  It was that I was going to 
come to visit my granddaughter. She wanted me to visit….  But oh my 
gosh, when they sold my car and cleared out my apartment, it just … it 
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made me a very bitter angry person for a while. And then I decided that I 
can’t hate my kids. They’ve got to be out here and I’ve got to love them in 
here. Thank the Lord I could. I still am wary about decision-making.  
One participant referred to the status of living in assisted living as being “an 
inmate.”  Another used the terms “condemned” and “railroaded” when describing 
his admission to a nursing home.  During the interview he said, “Of course I don’t 
begrudge them, but it’s because of my family that I’ve ended up in places like 
this.”  He explained his dislike of the setting, “It’s not that there’s anything wrong, 
it’s just that I can’t get out and get away…. Here, you don’t move.  Is it ok if I 
breathe?”  When naming the facility at the end of the orientation section of the 
MoCA, he added “Prison” after the facility name.  The same participant refused to 
answer MCPS question 2B, which asked how he wanted his children involved in 
future decisions. 
In discussing the relationship with the physician, several nursing home 
residents remarked that decision-making was adversely affected by their limited 
access to a physician.    
(14) You know what? You rarely see a doctor here…. I don’t know how long 
it’s been since I’ve seen a doctor. Dr. [Name omitted]. He’s a good guy. I 
probably haven’t seen [him] for a month.  I hear that he’s been here, but I 
don’t see him. I just don’t see him. And then I’ll see him maybe five 
minutes? At the most. 
(30) They change your meds. They remove something or add something, 
and it’s not up for discussion. You don’t even see the doctor here. Unless 
you’re dying, I guess. I haven’t pulled that one off yet. [Laughter]. You feel 
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like you’re not being involved. I’d like to be involved more. And I can 
understand why I’m not. I don’t go around begging to be involved. I’d 
prefer it if they would give me a little piece of paper saying what’s going 
on. I would relish that…. He comes along, he sees me in the hall. He puts 
his stethoscope here, 1, 2, 3, and he’s gone. And he’s done his check-up for 
the year or whatever it is.   
 
Relationships Between MoCA Subscales and Scaled  
Score and MCPS Choices 
Using Spearman’s Rho, the relationships among MoCA subscale scores 
and MCPS choices were explored.  After applying the Bonferroni correction to 
control for multiple tests, the only significant relationships (p < .05) were 
between the visual/spatial subscale and MCPS 1B (companion/past decision)      
(-.780, df=13, p=.028).    
 
Fatigue with the Interview 
The investigator who conducted the interviews as well as the investigator 
who coded the transcripts observed that fatigue was apparent in some 
participants’ responses as the interviews progressed.   Participants were offered 
the opportunity to stop the interview if the interviewer perceived emotional or 
physical discomfort.  Although all completed the interview portion of the study, 
three declined to take the MoCA.  Mean interview length from the time consent 





This study asked participants the same question from six different 
perspectives with semistructured cognitive interviewing questions interspersed.  
That approach helped to provide a nuanced and rounded description of 
participants’ preferences for decision-making involvement.  The approach also 
helped to identify some aspects of the decision-making process that are not 
captured by the MCPS. 
 
Study Procedures 
The MCPS was effective at eliciting the decision-making preferences of 
participants across a range of cognitive function.  The cognitive interviewing 
questions added depth to the understanding of the participants’ perspectives.   
The most problematic procedures involved attempts to elicit a past 
encounter.  This was evidenced by the difference between the number of 
participants who provided responses to the backward-looking MCPS questions 
were fewer than those who responded to the forward-looking MCPS questions:  
29 compared to 35 for the physician-related questions, and 25 compared to 36 for 
the companion-related questions (Table 6.6).  The use of the SDS relied on 
identifying the target encounter.  While the SDS might be effective in evaluating a 
recent encounter, it had a ceiling effect when used in the manner it was used in 
this study.  To evaluate the use of the SDS in this population, future studies could 
evaluate the decision-making process immediately after the encounter.  
Another important but unsuccessful part of this study was the failure to 
recruit the decision companions.  Similar studies have required that the 
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companion consent before either member of the dyad is enrolled (Karen B. 
Hirschman, Xie, Feudtner, & Karlawish, 2004; J. H. T. Karlawish et al., 2002).  
That approach may cause selection bias and rule out involvement of individuals 
who lack a caregiver or who do not want to participate as part of a dyad.   
In contrast, this study is limited by having only the perspective of the older 
adult.  Past studies suggest that the older adult and companion may not have 
views that are aligned (K. B. Hirschman, Joyce, James, Xie, Casarett, et al., 2005; 
K. B. Hirschman, Joyce, James, Xie, & Karlawish, 2005).  If policy and practice 
continue to move toward an inclusive approach to decision-making, it will be 
important to understand how dyads work, and how to support both the older 
adult and companion working within a supported decision-making model. 
 
Decision-Making Preferences 
Participants across a range of cognitive function assumed that they were 
the decision-makers, and all expressed a preference to be involved in decisions 
about their care to some degree.  These findings are consistent with the results of 
one study that addressed a similar research question (K. B. Hirschman, Joyce, 
James, Xie, Casarett et al., 2005; K. B. Hirschman, Joyce, James, Xie, & 
Karlawish, 2005).  Most participants also described different roles for physicians 
and family members, with physicians typically characterized as experts, and 
family members serving a reflective and deliberative role in the process.  Many 
participants assigned a more substantial decision-making role to the physician 
than to the family.  Contrasting the typical view of decision-making for older 
adults as occurring in a triad (Kapp, 1991; Wolff & Roter, 2008), participants 
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appeared to view decision-making as between two dyads. However the question 
structure, which posed each series of questions as two dyads, could have 
influenced how the responses were framed by participants.  If, on the other hand, 
older adults across a range of cognitive function do view decision-making as 
occurring within two dyads, not a triad, it would have implications for both 
clinical practice and policy.  Further exploration of this observation is therefore 
warranted. 
A minority of participants had conflict in the decision-making process with 
physicians who were viewed as too directive, or where past treatments had bad 
outcomes.  A minority of participants also had conflicts with families over 
decision-making, with most conflicts arising in the decision to place the 
participant in an assisted living facility or nursing home.  In contrast, many 
participants described positive support they received from family and physicians.  
A future study could investigate how to minimize conflict in these relationships. 
 
Self-Perception of Cognitive Status 
Many participants remarked on their own cognitive status, typically 
asserting that they retained the ability to participate in decisions.  A few 
participants were sensitive to the sense that others were not showing respect for 
them.  Others provided descriptions of providers and families who continued to 
honor them in the face of cognitive decline.  This is an area that has not been 





The study’s small sample size was its most substantial limitation.  The 
study population was not necessarily representative of all older adults, because it 
was not ethnically diverse, it represented only facility-dwelling individuals, and it 
was a highly educated group of people.  The study sample could also be affected 
by selection bias, because about one-third of those who were invited declined to 
participate.  In addition, participants were referred by facility employees who had 
the ability to exclude individuals for reasons other than their failure to meet 
inclusion criteria.   
 
Future Studies 
Although most of the participants in this study preferred autonomous 
decision-making when considering the role of a decision companion, many would 
need support in decision-making that the companion would provide. Future 
studies should consider how to help individuals and their companions to navigate 
the complicated world of medical decision-making in the even more complicated 
context of limited available options, limited resources, and complex 
relationships.   
Future studies should also develop ways to meaningfully engage 
individuals with impaired decisional abilities in decisions about their care.  
Although participants leaned heavily toward engaging with the physician, those 
physicians often lack the skills, training, and time to meaningfully engage in a 
decision-making process with individuals with impaired decisional abilities.  
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Intervention studies could examine different strategies for meaningful 
engagement. 
The finding that all participants viewed themselves as responsible for their 
decisions raises questions about the recommendations described in the 
introduction that instruct providers to obtain consent from a surrogate once the 
patient has been found to have capacity that falls below a certain threshold.  
Although this study was not designed to assess capacity, it is likely that many of 
the participants, perhaps even a majority, would have been found to lack the 
capacity to make their own treatment decisions under current assessment 
instruments, such as the MacArthur Capacity Assessment Test-Treatment.  
Additional research is needed to understand how consent is obtained when 
providers question their patients’ ability to provide informed consent.  In cases 
where the patient is excluded from decision-making, it is important to develop an 
understanding about what impact exclusion has on the individual’s emotional 
and physical wellbeing. 
 
Conclusion 
The words of one participant summarize the findings of this study:  “I 
know they have restrictions and rules they have to follow.  I know that.  But listen 






CPS Question Series and Response Options 
1A: Thinking about [the target visit], can you describe how you participated in the decisions that were made?
A B C D E
Active Collaborative Passive
I made the decision
about which tests or
treatments I
received.
I made the decision





My doctor and I
shared responsibility
for deciding which
tests or treatments I
received.












1B: Think about that visit, but instead of thinking about the doctor’s role, think about the role of [COMPANION] who
was there with you. Can you select the option that best reflects how you made the decision?
A B C D E
Active Collaborative Passive
I made the decision
about which tests or
treatments I
received.
I made the decision






















2A: Think about a doctor’s visit where a decision is made in exactly the way you want. Can you tell me how you
want your doctor involved?
A B C D E
Active Collaborative Passive











I prefer that my


















2B: Think about a doctor’s visit where a decision is made in exactly the way you want. Tell how you want [DECISION
COMPANION] to be involved
A B C D E
Active Collaborative Passive

















I prefer that [NAME]
make the final
decision about which









3A: When making decisions about your treatment right now, how do you weigh the input of your doctor and the
input of [DECISION COMPANION]?
A B C
My doctor’s input weighs most
heavily.
[NAME]’s input weighs most heavily. My doctor’s input and [NAME]’s
input are about equally important.
3B: If you were unconscious and seriously ill, how would you weigh the input of your doctor and the input of
[NAME]?
A B C
My doctor’s input weighs most
heavily.
[NAME]’s input weighs most heavily. My doctor’s input and [NAME]’s







Table 6.3    
Participant's Relationship w ith Decision Com panion  









Facility Staff 1 (3%)
 
  
Table 6.2  
Dem ographic Inform ation of Subjects (N=37) 
Characteristic N (%)
Age, years (mean ± SD) 81.8 ± 9.3
Female, n (%) 25 (68%)
Race, n (%)
Hispanic 1 (2.7%)
African American 1 (2.7%)
Asian 1 (2.7%)
White 34 (91.9%)






  High school graduate 10 (27%)
Some college 15 (40.5%)
 College graduate 12 (32.4%)
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Table 6.4    
MoCA Scores    
Scaled Raw High
Mean ± SD 19.1± 4.9 17.7 ± 5.5 19.74 ± 4.3
Range 7, 29 7, 29 7,29
  26* (no impairment detected) 3, 9% 2, 6% 3, 9%
1825* (mild cognitive impairment) 19, 56% 16, 47% 20, 59%
< 17* (moderate to severe
impairment) 12, 35%





Table 6.5    
Satisfaction w ith Decision Scale Responses  
Agree Disagree Total
Adequately informed 26 6 32
Best decision for me personally 27 3 30
Consistent with personal values 27 2 29
Successfully carry out 30 1 31
My decision to make 24 6 30
Satisfied with decision 29 3 32
 
 
Table 6.6        
Participant’s Decision-Making Involvem ent Preferences    
A B C D E Total
Past
Physician 1 9 9 5 5 29
Companion 4 8 9 2 2 25
Future
Physician 1 12 18 4 0 35
Companion 8 16 9 2 1 36
A. I make the decision…
B. I make the decision … after seriously considering [name or role]'s opinion
C. [Name or role] and I shared responsibility…
D. [Name or role] makes the decision … after seriously considering my opinion




Table 6.7     









in Decision 11 16 2 29
Participant Unable
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This study has explored the ethical, legal and policy aspects of decision-
making involvement for older adults across a range of cognitive function.   There 
were three purposes for the study.  The first was to understand the origins of the 
legal standards paradigm for capacity assessment and evaluate whether the 
approach remains an appropriate way to address the decision-making needs of 
older adults with impaired decisional abilities.  The second was to evaluate 
whether the CPS and NQ are reliable and valid instruments for eliciting the 
decision involvement preferences of older adults across a range of cognitive 
function.  The third was to generate a description of the decision involvement 
preferences of older adults across a range of cognitive function.   
The study makes the assertion that supported decision-making with older, 
facility-dwelling, adults, even those with impaired decisional abilities, is ethically 
sound and highly desirable, and provides evidence that using the Control 
Preference Scale to elicit involvement preferences that can serve as the basis for 
supported decision-making is reliable and feasible. 
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Major findings and the relationships between those findings are discussed 
in this chapter.  The chapter also contains recommendations for the future of 
decision-making for older adults with impaired decisional abilities.     
 
Ethics, Law, and Policy Addressing the Needs of  
Older Adults with Impaired Decisional Abilities 
The history and theory review of the legal standards paradigm for 
decision-making capacity was undertaken to explore why the legal standards 
paradigm was built on a dichotomous view of capacity, and whether the exclusion 
of individuals from decisions about their care is justified by empirical evidence or 
ethical principles. The inquiry identified a number of concerns.  The paradigm 
relies on untested assumptions about ethical behavior, the relationship between 
law and ethics, and the superiority of surrogate decision-makers over individuals 
whom clinicians have judged to lack capacity.  
First, the paradigm rests on the assumption that it is possible to categorize 
all individuals into a dichotomous framework, although everyone who addresses 
the issue agrees that capacity is on a spectrum.  Within the dichotomous 
framework wherein individuals found to “have capacity” are viewed as being fully 
autonomous and capable of making treatment decisions without assistance, and 
individuals found to “lack capacity” are viewed as fully lacking the ability to 
exercise autonomy, so they must be replaced by surrogates in the decision-
making process (Berg et al., 1996).  Building on concerns articulated by Kapp and 
Mossman (1996) nearly 2 decades ago, my analysis in Chapter 4 suggests that 
concerns about the legal standards paradigm have not been addressed by 
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researchers or ethicists in either the theoretical or clinical context. One concern is 
the error rates reported for every instrument developed to categorize individuals 
in a dichotomous structure (Moye, Marson, & Edelstein, 2013) that could be 
considered too high for such a high-stakes evaluation.   
A second assumption is that excluding patients whom a provider has 
found to lack capacity from decisions about their care is consistent with the 
ethical principle of beneficence.  This broad assumption rests on two further 
assumptions.   
The legal standards paradigm assumes that taking away an individual’s 
right to make decisions causes less harm than allowing n individual deemed to 
“lack capacity” to make decisions.  Empirical studies evaluating the Stress 
Process Model (Menne, Johnson, & Whitlatch, 2008; Menne, Judge & Whitlatch, 
2009; Menne, Tucke, Whitlatch, & Feinberg, 2008; Menne & Whitlatch, 2007; 
Whitlatch & Menne, 2009) and Self-Determination Theory (Kasser & Ryan, 1999) 
provide evidence that removing individuals from decisions about their treatment, 
just as removing them from decisions about daily life, could cause harm.  This 
evidence, albeit indirect, is not counterbalanced by any evidence that a system 
that categorically removes every individual from treatment decisions once a 
provider finds that the individual lacks capacity under a dichotomous framework 
is grounded in beneficence. There is no empirical evidence that the application of 
the legal standards paradigm strikes the right ethical balance between 
beneficence and autonomy.   
An alternative to the legal standards paradigm is to shift the research focus 
away from dichotomous classification of older adults into those who have and 
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those who lack capacity and instead use existing research on capacity to identify 
both strengths and weaknesses in patients with impaired decisional abilities.  An 
emerging approach is supported decision-making, which has been implemented 
in Canada, and was recently recognized in a decision issued by a Virginia court.   
The evidence that increased inclusion and engagement improves the well-
being of individuals supports the need to explore strategies that engage 
individuals, even those with impaired decisional abilities, in decisions about their 
care.  Supported decision-making is one such strategy.  Empirical evidence and 
quality metrics will be necessary to assure that supported decision-making 
structures provides needed and appropriate support.  There is a risk that 
supported decision-making could become surrogate decision-making in disguise. 
The conclusions described in Chapter 4, particularly when combined with 
the evidence reported in Chapter 6 that all of the study participants saw a role in 
decision-making for themselves, support a re-evaluation of the advice that 
individuals found to “lack capacity” should be removed from decisions about 
their care and replaced by surrogate decision-makers.  Without any change in 
law, providers can immediately begin to use shared decision-making techniques.  
For example, they can use the Control Preference Scale (CPS) to elicit patient 
preferences for involvement in decision-making.  This need not be limited to 
patients suspected of having impaired decisional abilities:  As noted by Nolan et 
al. (2005), the decision-making preferences of patients without suspected 
decisional abilities are heterogeneous and are often misunderstood.  Additional 




Reliability and Validity of the MCPS in the Study Population 
The research study addressing Aims 2 and 3 was designed to evaluate the 
use of the MCPS among older adults representing a range of cognitive function.  
There is a dearth of research that asks older adults with impaired cognitive 
function about their preferences (Beard, 2004); rather, in most studies 
individuals with impaired cognitive function are excluded from participation 
(Taylor, DeMers, Vig, & Borson, 2012).  As reported in Chapter 5, this study 
provides preliminary evidence that the MCPS was reliable and valid when used to 
elicit the decision involvement preferences of participants in this study.  
 
Modified Control Preference Scale 
Although the CPS has been widely used to assess decision involvement 
preferences in other populations, including older adults, the author has not found 
any use in adults suspected of having impaired cognitive function.  The study 
found no evidence to suggest that participants were unable to use the MCPS to 
describe their involvement in past encounters in relationship to both the 
physician and a companion, and to describe their preferred involvement in future 
encounters. The study provided evidence that participants’ choices on the MCPS 
reflected their preferences.  
By including two items asked of participants in the study by Nolan et al. 
(2005), it was possible to identify similarities and differences between participant 
responses over more questions.  It was also possible to test the internal 
consistency and logic of participant’s responses by asking a question that was 
very similar to a pair of MCPS questions.   
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The preferences of participants in this study were strikingly similar to the 
preferences of participants in the Nolan study (2005).  Although it was expected 
that the profile of responses might have similarities, the level of similarity was 
unexpected because the two study populations had very different demographic 
characteristics, with a significant difference in mean age (62 versus 82).  In 
addition, participants in the Nolan study were selected because they had recently 
been diagnosed with an illness that had a life expectancy of approximately 2 
years. Despite these differences the responses were similar.   
The similarities suggest the construct validity of using the MCPS in older 
adults with cognitive impairment.  “[C]onstruct validation is an ever-extending 
process of investigation and development” (Peter, 1981, p. 135).  The correlations 
between responses offered by participants in this study and the Nolan study are 
evidence to support the validity of using the MCPS in the study population. 
 
Correlations Among Responses to Different Items  
Representing the Same Construct 
Response patterns among three related items (MCPS 2A and 2B, which 
comprise the relative control score, and MCPS 3A) were analyzed to determine 
whether the responses that provided relative weight of involvement by the 
physician and companion were correlated. A relative control score was compared 
to the NQ input weight question.  Although 71% (20/28) of the paired relative 
control score and MCPS 3A selection were matched, the results were not 
significant, likely due in part to the small sample size with limited power.   
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Perhaps as important as the correlations is the qualitative evidence that 
this item provides, suggesting the presence of logic within the participants’ 
responses.  The 20 matched pairs were fully in line with rules of deductive logic 
because the response patterns were the same (e.g., relative control score 
“physician > companion” is logically aligned with MCPS 3A input weight 
“physician > companion.”  Pairs with opposite patterns defy the rules of 
deductive logic (e.g., relative control score “physician > companion” is 
incompatible with MCPS 3A input weight “physician < companion”).  Only two of 
the 28 participants responded in this manner.  The other six patterns are 
inconclusive as to logic because the imprecision of language does not allow a 
comparison.   
 
Internal Consistency Among MCPS Items 
Another way to evaluate the reliability of a scale is to calculate a 
Cronbach’s alpha.  In this study, the four MCPS items 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B had an 
acceptable level of internal consistency, as determined by a Cronbach's alpha of 
0.764.  This result not only serves as evidence that the four MCPS items are 
measuring the same construct, it also suggests that responses are reliably 
capturing a single construct across the study population.  
 
Analysis of Narrative Responses 
Overwhelmingly, responses to semistructured interview questions and 
spontaneous explanations offered by participants throughout the interview 
supported the reliability and validity of the participants’ responses to the MCPS 
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items.  There was a corresponding lack of evidence of that responses were not 
reliable or valid.   
Although a few participants struggled with the instrument, most easily 
selected among options offered and affirmed that the MCPS accurately captured 
their views of the relationships within the decision-making process.  These 
findings support the use of the MCPS in clinical practice and in future research 
studies. 
A limitation of the study is that the inclusion criteria prevented the 
identification of individuals with a level of impairment where the MCPS would 
not effectively capture preferences.  Further research would be necessary to 
determine where that point is.  
 
Significance 
The results of this portion of the study are important because they support 
the validity of an easy-to-use instrument that could be used in research and 
clinical settings to describe past encounters and preferences for involvement in 
future encounters by older adults across a range of decisional abilities.  Those 
who were able to respond to the MCPS included participants with MoCA scores 
as low as 7 and 10, suggesting severe impairment.  As providers are increasingly 
asked to deliver care that is patient-centered, whether in the context of shared or 
supported decision-making, instruments such as the MCPS will be important 
tools for eliciting the involvement preferences of patients across a range of 





There are older adults with decisional abilities (or, in some cases, 
functional abilities, such as the ability to communicate) who would be unable to 
respond to the MCPS or whose responses would not meaningfully connect their 
preferences to their choice of MCPS options.  This study did not identify any such 
individuals, in part, because participation in the study was cognitively 
demanding. Some potential participants were excluded because they lacked the 
physical or cognitive endurance needed to participate, or because they lacked 
understanding of their role in a research study.  Although one participant scored 
in a range suggesting severe cognitive impairment and many scored in a range 
suggesting moderate impairment, the study did not identify the level of 
impairment where individuals would be unable to express choices about care 
through the MCPS.  To address this limitation, future studies could separate the 
question series into more than one interview to reduce its demands on 
participants. 
Another limitation was the portion of the study that asked participants to 
identify and remain focused on a target encounter.  Some participants had 
difficulty identifying a target encounter, as evidenced by number of responses 
received:  25 participants responded to the MCPS items reflecting past 
encounters compared to 35 participants who responded to MCPS items reflecting 
future preferences.  Other participants may have been distracted by the 
preliminary emphasis on the target encounter; some participants continued to 
focus on the target encounter even when asked about their preferences for future 
encounters. Discussions eliciting and evaluating the target encounter did, 
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however, generate rich text that contributed to an understanding of how study 
participants viewed their roles in the decision-making process.  
A second limitation concerning the recall of a past encounter involves the 
limits of memory (Kahneman & Riis, 2005; Shell, 2013), wherein past memories 
are filtered through experience.  Typically, current expressions, such as 
participants’ responses to the MCPS that describe current preferences for 
decision involvement, will be more accurate than recollections of past 
perceptions.  This challenge is not unique to this study; it affects every study 
where participants are asked about past events.  In the context of this portion of 
the study, the accuracy of participants’ descriptions of past encounters was less 
important than their narrative descriptions, which provided a basis for 
comparing and evaluating their MCPS responses.   
 
Satisfaction with Decision Scale (SDS) 
The portion of the study that asked participants to identify a target 
encounter, and to rate that encounter using the SDS, was far less productive than 
the sections evaluating the MCPS.  The large majority of participants responded 
“agree” to most of the questions, including participants who subsequently 
expressed dissatisfaction with the encounter.  The lack of success with the SDS in 
this context does not suggest that the instrument would not be helpful in eliciting 
real-time evaluations of decision-making encounters.  It has been used in at least 
one study involving older adults with impaired cognitive function (Carmody et 




Preferences for Decision-Making Involvement 
This study is the first that the author is aware of that provides evidence 
that older adults across a range of cognitive function (MoCA Range 7-29) 
overwhelmingly want to be involved in their treatment decisions. A related but 
unanticipated finding that emerged was that all participants (even the few who 
selected a passive role) viewed themselves as being in control of the decision-
making process.  A third, also unanticipated finding was that many participants 
viewed their relationships with the physician and companion as two dyads, not a 
triad. 
Overwhelmingly, participants expressed a preference for involvement in 
care decisions.  Specific distribution of participant CPS responses with related 
narrative text was explored in Chapter 6. This author has observed that providers 
sometimes assume that older adults’ preferences are either independent or 
passive in the extreme; the study findings suggest that those assumptions are not 
true. 
The view that older adults on average prefer more passive roles in 
decision-making than younger patients has received some support from studies 
using the Control Preference Scale to evaluate older adults’ preferences.  For 
example, a study by Rodriguez et al. (2008) found that older participants leaned 
toward more passive roles.  The more assertive preferences selected by 
participants in this study aligned with the findings of Nolan et al. (2005), which, 
in contrast to Rodrigues and colleagues, used the CPS to compare participants’ 




This study shows that preferences for involvement among participants 
with cognitive impairment, like preferences of patients facing serious, life-
limiting illness in the study by Nolan et al. (2005), are heterogeneous, although 
some patterns emerge.   For example, there was a shift to more weight on the 
companion’s role in decision-making after the participant cannot participate in 
decision-making.   “Discerning the composite weight each patient would give to 
his or her own preferences, his or her loved ones’ input, and physician input is a 
complex process” (Nolan et al., 2005).  This study echoes that conclusion:  
understanding the decision-making preferences of older adults across a range of 
decisional abilities is a complex process.  
In addition to the qualitative data describing participants’ MCPS choices, 
two unanticipated codes emerged from the text.  The first was that all 
participants spoke in a manner that suggested that they were the primary 
decision-maker.  Although some expressed distress when they felt disrespect or 
neglect from others in the decision-making process, they did not express doubt 
that they remained the deciders.   Even those participants with the lowest MoCA 
scores were articulate in expressing past and desired future roles in care.  Many 
participants referenced their own cognitive status in responses, stating that at the 
time of the interview they were able to make their own decisions.   
The second unanticipated finding was that most participants characterized 
decision-making as occurring within two dyads (patient/physician and 
patient/companion(s)), not as a triad.  This finding is inconsistent with the 
common view that decision-making for geriatric patients functions as a triad 
(Greene & Adelman, 2013; Kapp, 1991).  This view may arise from the practical 
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fact that family or other companions often accompany older patients to medical 
appointments. In reporting their results, Nolan and colleagues observed, “These 
findings partially support, but also partly undermine, claims that the family has a 
large role in making medical decisions for patients with capacity in the United 
States” (2005, p. 348).  The same can be said for patients with impaired 
decisional abilities who would likely be found to lack capacity 
 
Significance 
The findings concerning participants’ preferences raise serious questions 
about the current approach to addressing medical decision-making by or on 
behalf of patients with impaired decisional abilities. Many of these participants 
would likely be judged to lack capacity to make a major healthcare decision, but 
all expressed a desire to participate in making decisions about their care. 
Excluding them from the decision-making process could certainly cause the 
distress articulated by the few participants who described instances where 
decisions were made that were contrary to their wishes.  That said, many would 
need support in decision-making from either a companion or a provider. 
Another aspect of the findings that raise concerns is the discrepancy 
between the substituted judgment model of surrogate decision-making and 
preferences for decision-making among the participants in this study, as well as 
the Nolan study.  Even in the face of incapacity, many participants want their 
physicians to play a more significant role in the decision-making process than 
their companions, yet the approach to surrogate decision-making would, by 
default, place the companion over the physician in the decision-making 
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hierarchy.  Research is needed to investigate whether the current models for 
surrogate decision-making reflect how individuals want decisions made and, if 
not, what better models might exist.  
The dynamic seen in this study and Nolan study suggests a need to 
question assumptions about the family’s role in decision-making, and to explore 
how to most effectively involve family in the decision-making process, whether or 
not the patient lacks capacity.  Providers can explore patients’ preferences about 
the role of the family in decision-making, and can work to accommodate those 
preferences to the extent possible.  
 
Study Limitations 
The study’s small sample size was a substantial limitation.  In addition, the 
study population was not necessarily representative of all older adults, because it 
was not racially or ethnically diverse, it represented only facility-dwelling 
individuals, and it was a highly educated group of people.  The study sample 
could also reflect selection bias, because about one-third of those who were 
invited declined to participate.  In addition, the individuals invited were referred 
by facility employees who could have excluded individuals for reasons other than 
their failure to meet inclusion criteria.  Future studies could address these 
limitations. 
 
Future Research Directions 
A well developed approach to supported decision-making would address 
many of the concerns raised by this study’s findings.  In the clinical setting, right 
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now, providers can use existing tools to understand the role patients want in 
making decisions about their care in relationship with their providers and their 
companions (CPS) and the patients’ abilities and areas in need of support.  
Instead of using capacity assessment instruments to make dichotomous 
judgments that result in the exclusion of individuals from decision-making, 
providers could use them to identify areas where they can offer support. 
Providers, even now, have a rarely mentioned a duty to try to ameliorate the 
effects of sensory disabilities, medical conditions, or behavioral health concerns 
to allow the person to most fully participate in decisions.  Physicians should seek 
the support of nurses, social workers, psychologists, speech therapists, and other 
providers to assist in this process, when feasible. 
If an individual remains unable to make decisions without support, 
providers can establish decision-making strategies, such as memory assistance or 
eliciting preferences that can help to make choices among options.  Providers can 
adopt strategies that show basic respect for individuals with impaired cognitive 
function by including them in the decision-making process to the degree they 
desire.  For example, when getting signatures on consent forms, both the 
individual and a companion can sign together.  Providers could resort to 
exclusion only when other options, such as support from nursing and social work, 
have failed. 
While there are work-arounds available to providers, more is needed.  
Research is needed to create and evaluate interventions to meaningfully engage 
people with impaired decisional abilities in decisions about their care.  Although 
participants leaned toward engaging with the physician to make decisions, those 
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physicians may lack the skills, training, and time to meaningfully engage in a 
decision-making process with individuals with impaired decisional abilities.   
Older adults with impaired cognitive function, as well as other populations 
of people who would benefit from supported decision-making, may be vulnerable 
to abuse or coercion.  Strategies are needed to assure that decision-making 
processes are designed to elicit the person’s preferences, and don’t simply make it 
appear that the provider’s or companion’s preferences are the person’s.   
Future studies should also consider how to help individuals and their 
companions to navigate the complicated world of medical decision-making in the 
even more complicated context of limited available options, limited resources, 
and complex relationships.   
 
Implications for Education 
The study supports the need for education of all healthcare providers who 
participate in the process of obtaining informed consent, whether in a formal 
setting where a form is being signed, or in a less formal setting where routine care 
is being delivered.  There is evidence that misunderstandings about capacity are 
rampant; if the rights of vulnerable patients are to be respected, capacity should 
be understood by all health care professionals.   
Although most professionals would receive some training in ethics that 
touches on informed consent and capacity, if detailed, the training would be 
based on the legal standards approach to capacity assessment.  The results of this 
study suggest that providers should receive training to look beyond the legal 
standards approach to the ethical principles and, for each individual, consider 
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whether exclusion from decision-making is necessary.  Further training – not yet 
developed – could provide the skill in eliciting preferences and meaningfully 
engaging older adults in decisions about their care, even as they face impaired 
decisional abilities.  Ideally, such training would be offered as continuing 
education for professionals and as part of degree preparation.  
 
Conclusion 
Work is needed to develop a new legal, clinical, and ethical framework for 
addressing the decision-making needs of older adults whose decisional abilities 
are impaired or in decline.  Some of the work will be in the legal and policy arena, 
but human subjects research is also needed to develop a model of decision-
making involvement, including supported decision-making for older adults with 
impaired decisional abilities.  For many reasons, research on shared decision-
making, specifically, and decision-making preferences, generally, has been 
conducted in populations of individuals without impaired cognitive capacity.  The 
vast majority of research on individuals with impaired decisional capacity has 
focused primarily on instruments and measures designed to determine when the 
individual should be excluded from the process, not on how to understand the 
individual’s desire to be included in the process, or when inclusion is the desire, 
how to include the individual in decisions about medical treatment.  The absence 
of research on decision-making patterns and preferences among a population of 
older adults representing a range of cognitive function has left gaps in clinical 
best practices and informed consent theory and policy. 
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A model of inclusive decision-making for older adults with impaired 
decisional abilities will require the development of interventions and clinical best 
practices to promote the inclusion of individuals in decisions about their care. A 
program of research is needed to provide direction to policy-makers, as well as 
patients, caregivers, providers, attorneys, and judges who need guidance in 
addressing the decision-making needs of older adults with impaired decisional 
abilities. The results of this study will provide basic information that will serve as 
the building block for a new approach to decision-making for older adults with 
impaired decisional abilities.  Hopefully, the results will also encourage providers 
to consider how to meaningfully engage all patients who want to be involved in 
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Re co rd ID  
Age  ( in  ye ars )   
Ge n de r   Male  
  Fe m ale  
Race / Eth n icity   No n -H ispan ic W hite  
  African  Am e rican  
  H ispan ic 
  Native  Am e rican  
  Asian / H aw aiian  Native / Pacific Is lan de r 
H ighe s t Educatio n    Le ss  than  H igh  Scho o l 
  H igh  Scho o l Graduate  o r Equivale n t 
So m e  Co lle ge  
  Co lle ge  Graduate  
  Po s t-Graduate  
Marital Status    Sin gle  
  Marrie d 
  Divo rce d 
  W ido w e d 
  Othe r 
City/ To w n  o f 
re s ide n ce  
 
Se ttin g   H o m e   
  As s is te d livin g  
  Nurs in g ho m e   




What does the 
person do at your 
doctor’s 
appointments? 
  Writes down what doctor says, records instructions, 
takes notes, remembers 
  Gives information, explains your medical condition 
or needs to the doctor 
 
 Explains doctor's instructions to you 
 
 Asks questions 
 
 Translates language 
 
 Schedules appointments 
  Nothing 
  Keeps me company, sits with me 
  Moral support 
  Transportation 
 
 Physical assistance with walking or dressing Helps 





TARGET ENCOUNTER:  Think about a recent encounter with a doctor where 
decisions were made about whether you should have tests or treatments.  Can 
you tell me a little about it?    Where necessary, prompt: 
 What kind of a doctor?   
 What was happening that caused you to see a doctor?  
 Did you receive any treatment or tests (prescriptions, x-rays, other) as a 
result of the doctor visit? 
  
Decision Companion 
Is there someone who goes to doctor’s 






Does this person help you make decisions 




Is this the same person you would want to 
make medical decisions for you if you were 

















SATISFACTION WITH DECISION SCALE (SDS) 
 Agree Neutral Disagree 
I am satisfied that I was adequately informed 
about the issues important to my decision 
   
The decision I made was the best decision 
possible for me personally. 
   
I am satisfied that my decision was consistent 
with my personal values. 
   
I expect to successfully carry out (or continue to 
carry out) the decision I made. 
   
I am satisfied that this was my decision to make.    
I am satisfied with my decision    





CONTROL PREFERENCE SCALE (CPS):  PAST ENCOUNTER 
Thinking about that 
visit, can you choose 
the option that best 
describes how you 
participated in the 
decisions that were 
made? (show  
illustration) 
  I made the decisions about which tests or 
treatments I received. 
 
 I made the final decisions about which tests or 
treatments I received after seriously considering my 
doctor's opinions. 
 
 My doctor and I shared responsibility for deciding 
which tests or treatments I received. 
  My doctor made the final decisions about which 
tests or treatments I received after seriously 
considering my opinions. 
 
 My doctor made the decisions about which tests or 
treatments I received. 
Cognitive Interviewing Probes: 
 Was the way decisions were made offered as a choice in the previous 
question? 
 Can you tell me about the decision in your own words?  
 Can you explain why you chose the option you did?   
 What kinds of things would you want your doctor to consider when 
forming opinions about the treatment you would receive?   
o Spirituality? Religion? Cost? 

 Additional probing questions when necessary.   
Think about that visit.  
Instead of thinking 
about the doctor's role, 
think about the role of 
[COMPANION] who 
was there with you.  
Can you select the 
option that best 
reflects how you made 
decisions. 
 
 I made the decisions about which tests or 
treatments I received. 
  I made the final decisions about which tests or 
treatments I received after seriously considering 
[COMPANION]’s opinions. 
  [COMPANION] and I shared responsibility for 
deciding which tests or treatments I received. 
 
 [COMPANION] made the final decisions about 
which tests or treatments I received after seriously 
considering my opinions. 
 
 [COMPANION] made the decisions about which 
tests or treatments I received. 
Cognitive Interviewing Probes: 

 Was the way decisions were made offered as a choice in this question? 

 Can you tell me about the decision in your own words?  

 Can you explain why you chose the option you did?   

 What kinds of things would you want your companion to consider when 
forming opinions about the treatment you would receive?   
o Spirituality? Religion? Cost? 




CONTROL PREFERENCE SCALE (CPS):  FUTURE ENCOUNTER 
Now think about a 
doctor's visit that 
happens in the future 
where a decision is 
made in exactly the 
way you want.  Tell me 
how you want your 
doctor to be involved. 
(show  illustration) 
  I prefer to make the decisions about which tests or 
treatments I receive 
 
 I prefer to make the final decision about which tests 
or treatment I receive after seriously considering my 
doctor's opinion. 
 
 I prefer that my doctor and I share responsibility for 
deciding which tests or treatments I receive.  
  I prefer that my doctor make the final decision 
about which tests or treatments I receive after 
seriously considering my opinion. 
 
 I prefer to leave all decisions about which tests or 
treatments I receive to my doctor. 
Cognitive Interviewing Probes: 
 Was the way you want decisions to be made offered as a choice in the 
previous question? 
 Can you tell me in your own words how you want decisions made?  
 Can you explain why you chose the option you did?   
 In a perfect scenario, what kinds of things would you want your doctor to 
consider when forming opinions about the treatment you would receive?   
o Spirituality? Religion? Cost? 

 Additional probing questions when necessary.   
Now think about a 
doctor's visit that 
happens in the future 
where a decision is 
made in exactly the 
way you want.  Tell me 
how you want 
[COMPANION] to be 
involved. (show  
illustration) 
 
 I prefer to make the decisions about which tests or 
treatments I receive 
  I prefer to make the final decision about which tests 
or treatment I receive after seriously considering 
[COMPANION]’s opinion. 
  I prefer that [COMPANION] and I share 
responsibility for deciding which tests or treatments 
I receive. I prefer that [COMPANION] make the 
final decision about which tests or treatments I 
receive after seriously considering my opinion. 
 
 I prefer to leave all decisions about which tests or 
treatments I receive to [COMPANION]. 
Cognitive Interviewing Probes: 

 Was the way decisions were made offered as a choice in this question? 

 Can you tell me about the decision in your own words?  

 Can you explain why you chose the option you did?   

 What kinds of things would you want [COMPANION] to consider when 
forming their opinions about the treatment you would receive?   
o Spirituality? Religion? Cost? 





NOLAN ET AL. (2 0 0 5)  QUESTIONS 
In making decisions 
about your treatment 
right now, how do you 
weigh the input of your 
doctor and the input of 
[COMPANION]?  
Clarify  if necessary . 
  My doctor's input weighs most heavily. 
 
 [COMPANION]'s input weighs most heavily. 
 
 My doctor's input and [COMPANION]'s input are 
about equally important. 
Now think about a 
decision about your 
treatment being made 
at a time when you 
were unconscious and 
seriously ill.  How 
would you weigh the 
input of your doctor 
and the input of 
[COMPANION]?  
Clarify  if necessary . 
 
 My doctor's input weighs most heavily. 
 
 [COMPANION]'s input weighs most heavily. 
 
 My doctor's input and [COMPANION]'s input are 





When people face a serious illness, they have different preferences about 
what they are told. They also may want different things considered in making 
decisions. I am going to ask you about what you want the doctor to tell you if you 
are diagnosed with a serious illness. 
 Agree Neutral Disagree 
All the information the doctor can give me    
How the condition will affect my goals    
How the condition will affect my relationships    
Pain    
Difficulty breathing    
Inability to recognize friends or family    
Trouble getting out of bed and moving around on 
my own 
   
Feeling confused    
Trouble eating on my own    
Nausea or vomiting    
Trouble getting dressed on my own    
Trouble bathing on my own    
How long I am likely to live    
Ability to live where I live now    
Ability to make decisions about my own care    
CONCLUSION 
I have asked you many questions about your preferences for making medical 
treatment decisions. Is there anything else you would like to tell me about how 
you want decisions about your care to be made? 
 
 
